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Abstract
This dissertation is an examination of Heidegger’s account of authenticity in 
Being and Time within the context of his phenomenological project of a fundamental 
ontology of being. The role of authenticity within Heidegger’s unfinished 
fundamental ontological project of the meaning of being is related primarily to two 
major concepts: death and das Man (the They). Heidegger starts by investigating the 
phenomena of our average everyday existence in order to determine the existential- 
ontological structures that underlie and make possible our being. The question of 
being towards which Heidegger is directed requires an analysis of the only being that 
understands what it means to be, human being (Dasein). Dasein is the only available 
access we have to the understanding of being, and thus it is necessary to undertake an 
analysis of both Dasein’s understanding and its own being. To understand Dasein as 
a whole, however, we must also take death into account. As a being that projects its 
possibilities, Dasein is only a totality when its possibilities end with death. However, 
everyday Dasein, as absorbed in the They, has an inauthentic attitude towards death 
and its own being, and does not understand its being as it really is. Being-towards- 
death is an ontological structure that, when lived authentically, allows Dasein to 
grasp itself as a whole. This thesis will review the place of these ideas in Being and 
Time, as well as address criticisms of Heidegger’s work in order to determine 
whether we can ultimately accept his account of authenticity.
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Note on References
All references to Being and Time are given in the form (SZ x), where x is the 
original page number from the 7th German edition (1953) of Sein und Zeit. The 
translation used is Joan Stambaugh’s 1996 version. Other works are cited in the 
usual way. All italicized words in the citations from Being and Time are Heidegger’s 
originals, not the addition of the author.
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1. Why Authenticity?
As a philosopher, Heidegger’s main concern was the question of being. His 
major work, Being and Time (1927), was an attempt to delineate a fundamental 
ontology of being. This attempt leads Heidegger into an analysis of the nature of 
human being {Dasein), in which authenticity plays an essential role. In his account of 
authenticity, Heidegger is greatly influenced by Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Husserl, 
but unlike these other philosophers, he makes authenticity an integral part of a larger 
ontological context. The concepts of death and the They {das Man) can also be 
traced as parallels to similar concepts in the works of these philosophers. To 
understand the significance of the account of authenticity and inauthenticity in Being 
and Time, it is necessary to focus on the context of the broader ontological project 
that Heidegger is addressing. This dissertation will survey the question of being 
before taking up the being of Dasein and its ways of being both authentic and 
inauthentic. The first step is an examination of the general concept of authenticity 
and its philosophical antecedents in more detail.
1.1 A Definition
What does it mean to be authentic? The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
authenticity as being “being in accordance with fact, being true in substance, being 
genuine, real or actual.” In everyday life, there are two ways of thinking of 
authenticity. The first applies to objects, and we generally think of authenticity as 
genuineness or correspondence to what is true or valid. For example, a painting by 
Picasso is said to be authentic if  it is genuine, if  it is the true and original artwork. In 
this case, the painting is authentic because it was created by the artist whose name is
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attached to it: the painting is an authentic Picasso precisely because it was painted by 
Picasso. Similarly, a restaurant that claims to serve ‘authentic’ Indian cuisine means 
that their food corresponds to what is truly and actually eaten in India. In this 
everyday sense of authenticity, we mean that something is real, that it is not a 
counterfeit or an imitation. The second sort of authenticity applies to people, but is 
related to the first definition. This is a more modem usage of the term, and it 
involves the idea of the authentic individual as sincere or honest. With this usage 
there is an implication of the absence of deception, where “outward behaviour is 
consistent with public declarations,” (Golomb 1995, 8) and there is often a sense of 
the authentic individual as as being ‘true to oneself,’ or being what one really is. 
Authenticity in terms of the self can be philosophically problematic and draws 
attention to questions of selfhood and identity, as well as ethical issues. What does it 
mean for the inauthentic individual not to be himself? Is it even possible to be 
something other than what one really is? How ought one to live in order to be 
authentic?
‘Authentic’ is the usual translation of the German term eigentlich, and most 
commentators and scholars of Heidegger’s thought tend to use this word. However, 
it is important to note that eigentlich comes from the root eigen, meaning ‘own;’ 
thus, being authentic has in the German a certain sense of ownness or mineness, a
sense that is unfortunately lost in the English translation. By ownness, Heidegger is f 0u
ur-
referring to jhat which belongs to an individual alone, undihited by influence from - y
fbe_ inauthentic public sphere. Heidegger is emphasizing, in his account of 
authenticity, the importance of that aspect of the self that can be seen as ‘pure’ 
individuality. Unfortunately, ‘authentic’ has the connotation of “actualizing a 
concrete possibility of itself that is in some sense its ‘real’ self, as when we speak of
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finding one’s goal in life, one’s true calling, etc.” (Boedeker, 96) Some 
commentators have attempted to solve the problem of translation by offering 
alternate versions: Dasein’s ‘being authentic’ as ‘taking ownership of itself,’ 
(Boedeker, 80) or ‘authenticity’ as ‘owned existence.’ (King, 40) The problem with 
this translation is the unwieldiness of the phrasing, as well as the translation of 
‘inauthenticity’ as ‘disowned existence’ or ‘self-disownership’ carrying with it the 
problematic implication that inauthentic Dasein chooses the state of inauthenticity. I 
believe that ‘authentic’ will suffice as a translation of eigentlich, as long as the reader 
keeps in mind the sense of ownness that Heidegger has in mind, and disregards the 
connotations mentioned above.
1.2 Situating Authenticity Within the Philosophical Tradition
Issues concerning authenticity and the self have been a subject of 
philosophical inquiry since the ancient Greek injunction to “Know thyself,” although 
it was only taken up extensively and given a central philosophical role with the 
advent of existentialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, 
authenticity in this form is a major concern of existentialism, broadly conceived as 
the tradition beginning with Kierkegaard and Nietzche, up to twentieth century 
figures such as Sartre and Camus. There are aspects of the concept of authenticity in 
all of their works, and in some sense Heidegger can be included in this group, 
although he himself disliked the label of existentialism. Although the emphasis and 
form of each philosopher takes a different approach to authenticity, all are concerned 
with what it means for the self to be true to itself. A frequeuntly recurring theme is 
the idea of the authentic self transcending societal values, and in this sense, 
authenticity also deals with ethics and intersubjectivity. Heidegger was also writing
from within the phenomenological tradition Heidegger brings all of these various 
ideas into his account of authenticity, and is himself greatly influenced by other 
philosophers in the tradition, especially Kierkegaard, and to a lesser extent, 
Nietzsche.
1.2.1 Nietzsche
There are several concepts in Nietzsche’s thought that can perhaps be seen as 
precursors to Heideggarian authenticity, although it is important to note that these are 
not being presented as influences Heidegger draws directly from Nietzsche, but 
rather as a way of showing that something parallelling authenticity is present in 
Nietzsche’s work. Certainly, Heidegger was familiar with Nietzsche’s thought, and 
published a book on Nietzsche later in his career, as well as discussing him in What 
is Called Thinking? (Mulhall 2001, 300) However, for the purposes of this paper, I 
will consider Nietzsche only within the context of Being and Time. Heidegger 
mentions him three times in Being and Time, although these references are rather off­
hand and are not explicit references to any of the concepts that could be considered 
precursors of authenticity. The role Nietzsche plays in influencing Heidegger is 
perhaps not as important as Kierkegaard’s, but some commentators, such as 
Zimmerman, have drawn attention to it.
The concepts of will to power, the iibermensch and the herd are probably the 
most similar aspects of Nietzsche to Heideggerian authenticity. The iibermensch is 
an individual who rises above the common mass of humanity, the herd, and wills a 
new set of values to himself: “The man who breaks their tables of values, the breaker, 
the lawbreaker; yet he is the creator.” (Nietzsche 1966b, 23) The process of creation 
by which the ubermensch creates new standards and values for himself involves
9
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overcoming the-setf-as a product of the herd in order to become a self that is 
responsible only to itself and its own values, through the will to power. (Golomb 
1995, 70) In doing so, the ubermensch recognizes the finitude of his own existence 
and that this life has only a contingent basis. In contrast, the common masses do not 
exercise their will to power for the purpose of creating new values, but instead 
passively accept their values as being handed down by God or society. The herd was 
Nietzsche’s disparaging term for the group of mass humanity, whose members do not 
think for themselves and “accept...whatever is shouted into [their] ears by someone 
who issues commands—parents, teachers, laws, class prejudices, public opinions.” 
(Nietzsche 1966a, 110) The herd accepts its values and morals solely on the basis of 
the ‘thou shalt,’ it does and believes the things that ‘one does’ or ‘one believes’ in a 
certain situation. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes the will to power 
as the will to overcome: “A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Behold, it is 
the tablet of their overcomings; behold, it is the voice of their will to power.” 
(Nietzsche 1966b, 58) The will to overcome can be interpreted as a will to 
overcoming both the values imposed by the herd, but more importantly, to 
overcoming the self s own immersion in this environment and thus rejecting the 
elements of the self that result from this absorption. (Golomb 70) Zarathustra tells 
those who seek to become ubermensch: “You have long belonged to the herd. The 
voice of the herd will still be audible in you. And when you will say ‘I no longer 
have a common conscience with you,’ it will be a lament and an agony...Can you 
give yourself your own evil and your own good and hang your own will over 
yourself as law? Can you be your own judge and avenger of your law?” (Nietzsche 
1966b, 62-63)
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Heidegger’s thought displays several parallels to these Nietzschean concepts, j 
The ubermensch can be seen as parallel to the authentic individual who frees himself ( 
from the meanings given to him by the They {das Man), and with authentic \
i
i
resoluteness faces the finitude of existence and the lack of individual possibilities; \ 
there are also similarities between Nietzsche’s will to power and authentic Dasein’s 
resoluteness as the choice to remove oneself from the influence of the public. The 
ubermensch, however, does not necessarily free himself from Heideggarian 
inauthenticity, but from the morals and values of society. It is still possible, for the 
Ubermemch-t£ibQ inauthentic, in Heidegger’s terms, because self-overcoming does 
not necessarily involve overcoming the inauthentic self; since Nietzsche never 
addresses the question of being, he does not say anything about the ubermensch 
overcoming the way of being of the herd. The passive acceptance embodied by the 
herd is similar to Dasein’s inauthentic everyday life, where values and meaning are 
accepted as they are handed down by the They. Both accounts emphasize the lack of 
creativity and responsibility that exemplify humanity and our everyday lives, and 
indeed Nietzsche’s statement “No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, 
everybody is the same,” (Nietzsche 1966b, 18) parallels the average everydayness of 
inauthentic Dasein.
While it seems that Heidegger may have appropriated and adapted certain 
concepts from Nietzsche, there are still insurmountable differences between the two. 
Nietzsche places an emphasis on originality, in that the ubermensch must create new 
and unique values in contrast to the uniformity and sameness of the herd. Heidegger, 
on the other hand, does not claim that authenticity requires this sort of originality; the 
authentic individual takes up the same possibilities as others, but in a way that is 
directed towards his finitude. Theoretically, each Dasein could become authentic
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(although this is extremely unlikely), but Nietzsche’s stress on originality suggests 
that the ubermensch can only be manifested in a few individuals. Despite these
obvious parallels, Heidegger still includes Nietzsche in the group of philosophers
\ s .
who have forgotten Being, insofar as Nietzsche’s account is an onticrexistentiell one 
that neglects the question of the fundamental ontological-existential constitution of 
Dasein. (Golomb 1995, 82; Zimmerman 1981, 95) As Philipse says, “Whereas 
Nietzsche rejected transcendence and celebrated the vitality of life in this world, 
Heidegger believed that human existence is meaningless unless it is related to 
transcendent Being.” (Philipse 1998, 286). That is, Nietzsche focused on a specific 
anthropological account of humanity, while Heidegger was concerned with the 
ontology of being that underlies humanity. Nietzsche’s concern with the specific 
characteristics of a particular situation characterizes ontic-existentiell accounts, 
whereas Heidegger’s attempt to give a picture of the existential characteristics that 
underlie the existence of all human beings is ontological-existential. Nietzsche was 
not interested in giving ontological explanations, and for this reason Heidegger says 
that Nietzsche fails to address the question of the meaning of being. (Zimmerman 
1981,95)
1.2.2 Kierkegaard
Another philosopher who greatly influences Heidegger’s account of 
authenticity is the Christian existentialist Kierkegaard, although Heidegger’s account 
is not itself explicitly Christian. Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard three times in 
Being and Time, exclusively in footnotes, but with clear admiration for his 
explanation of the concept of Angst, or anxiety: “Kierkegaard got furthest of all in 
the analysis of the phenomenon of Angst” (SZ 190 n. 4) and “More is to be learned
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philosophically from his ‘edifying’ writings than from his theoretical work—with the 
exception of the treatise on the concept of Angst.” (SZ 235 n. 6) The treatise to 
which Heidegger refers is The Concept o f  Dread (sometimes translated as The 
Concept o f  Anxiety), and it is from this work that Heidegger borrows a great deal of 
his own account of Angst. His account of inauthenticity is also influenced by 
Kierkegaard’s discussion of the public in The Present Age, (Hall 1984, 199), as well 
as by Kierkegaard’s other works, including The Sickness Unto Death, Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, and Fear and Trembling.
There is a great deal that can be said about the relationship between 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger, especially concerning Angst, but due to constraints of 
space, I shall limit myself to a brief overview of the major points. In The Concept o f  
Dread, Kierkegaard discusses Angst in conjunction with original sin, the idea of 
falling which Dreyfus contends Heidegger attempted to secularize in his account of 
falling prey. While Kierkegaard describes sinfulness as the distraction of everyday 
life that prevents us from hearing the call to absolute Christian commitment, 
Heidegger puts forth a secularized version in which falling prey, as absorptionjn the 
everyday world, conceals being from us. (Dreyfus 1991,313) Kierkegaardian Angst 
is the “reality of freedom as possibility anterior to possibility” (Kierkegaard 1944, 
38) in which “the relation of dread to its object [is] to something which is nothing.” 
(Kierkegaard 1944, 39) Angst is anxiety about “one’s own potential for 
existence...one’s ‘being able’ as one’s capacity for self-determination,” (Magurshak 
1985, 172) and as such, one is anxious about nothing, insofar as the possibilities that 
lie ahead of one can be called ‘nothing’ in their non-actuality. Kierkegaard speaks of 
‘spirit’ as the synthesis of the psychological and the physical (Dunning 1985, 14), as 
a defining characteristic of humans that is related to itself and its situation as anxiety
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or dread. (Kierkegaard 1944, 40) Spirit is what allows humans to determine their 
selves through their possibilities. It is clear that Heidegger appropriates this account 
of Angst almost in its entirety; when he says that “Nothing of that which is at hand 
and objectively present within the world, functions as what which Angst is anxious 
about,” (SZ 186) he echoes Kierkegaard’s claim. Similarly, Heideggerian Angst 
concerns Dasein’s being-in-the-world, and its potentiality-for-being, or the 
possibilities that may come about in the future.
Another idea that Kierkegaard puts forth is the self as lost in the public world, 
resulting in dread or anxiety, requiring a major commitment that defines one’s life, 
which he calls the ‘leap of faith.’ Kierkegaard believes that this commitment 
involves a relation to the absolute The self that has made the leap is similar to' 
Heidegger’s authentic self in that it realizes it has many possibilities and the choices 
that it makes define its life. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger speak disparagingly of 
the public. Kierkegaard describes the public as characterized by “detached, 
superficial knowing and understanding.. .hand-in-hand with talkativeness, the 
superficial discussion of anything and everything.” (Hall 1984, 192) T his|s clearly a 
precursor to Heidegger’s discussion of the idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity of the 
They, although Kierkegaard does not incorporate the public as part of the essential 
structure of human being. In this sense, Heidegger is right in calling it ontic- 
existentiell, since it is concerned more with the specific situation of the modem era, 
rather than as an always already present feature of Dasein. However, both 
philosophers would concede that an authentic existence would require tearing one’s 
self away from the public. I will discuss in more detail the nature of the relationship 
between Kierkegaard, Heidegger and authenticity in Chapter 4.
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However, as with Nietzsche, Heidegger believed that Kierkegaard was only 
addressing the ontic-existentiell aspect of existence and that “the existential 
problematic is so foreign to him that in an ontological regard he is completely under 
the influence of Hegel and his view of ancient philosophy.” (SZ 235 n.6) 
Kierkegaard himself refers to The Concept o f  Dread as a “psychological
deliberation.” (Kierkegaard 1944, 21) He did not intend his account of Angst to be
anjontological one, but Heidegger faults him for failing to examine the ontological 
foundations of being, and falling prey to the forgetting of being in the same way as 
the rest of the philosophical tradition.
1.2.3 Husserl
In some respects, Heidegger can be seen as member of the existentialist 
tradition, but he is probably more famously associated with phenomenology, a school 
of thought beginning in the late nineteenth century with Brentano and Husserl, 
carrying up to the mid-twentieth century, with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger 
was greatly influenced by Husserl, although their views diverged quite early in 
Heidegger’s philosophical career. Heidegger mentions Husserl occasionally in Being 
and Time, but never really explicitly criticizes him or takes up his views in order to 
refute them. During the period towards the end of his life, Husserl developed 
material concerning self-responsibility and the life-world, in Crisis o f  the European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936). There is also talk of self­
responsibility in the Cartesian Meditations (1931). Seeing as Husserl wrote these 
works after Heidegger had published Being and Time, one may ask to what extent he 
was influenced by Heidegger’s work, or vice versa. For Husserl, the life-world 
(Lebenswelt) is “the world pregiven...the world valid as existing for us and to which
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we, together, belong, the world as world for all, pregiven with this ontic meaning.” 
(Husserl 1970, 109) The life-world is the world we live in, that is there for each of 
us, in which everything we do is based, and constitutes the “sole absolute foundation 
of all our moral, scientific, philosophical, and everyday practices.” (Bell 1990, 228) 
Physical objects, for instance, are only one part of the life-world, which also contains 
cultural, social, moral and other aspects. This is similar to Heidegger’s idea that 
humans always exist in a world that is always already ‘there,’ consisting of both 
physical and social aspects.
There are certainly further similarities between the two concerning the idea of 
everydayness as being inauthentic. Husserl called this state of average everydayness 
the natural attitude, and describes it as “straightforwardly living toward whatever 
objects are given...in normal, unbroken constancy...We, the subjects, in our normal, 
unbroken, coherent life, know no goals which extend beyond this; indeed we have no 
idea that there could be others.” (Husserl 1970, 144) The natural attitude is a state of 
naivete concerning the actual constitution of the world, and in this state the subject 
fails to see the transcendental nature of the world and its subjective constitution 
(Buckley 1992, 200) This unquestioning attitude towards the world leads Husserl to 
develop the phenomenological reduction, or transcendental epoche, as a method of 
escaping the unproven assumptions and conjectures of the natural attitude. The 
epoche requires the exclusion of all principles not founded on absolute evidence 
from being a basis for philosophical reflection It involves a purposeful decision to 
philosophize without careless assumptions or prejudice, basing everything on 
absolutely certain evidence, and requires an attitude of philosophical self­
responsibility. (Husserl 1960, 6) The entire process that Husserl describes,jnoving 
from a naive natural attitude to responsible philosophical awareness, is a precursor to
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Heidegger’s^process of becoming authentic through resoluteness, where authentic 
Dasein decides to take a stand against falling back into the inauthenticity of the They. 
However, while the phenomenological reduction requires that Husserl separate the 
everyday world from apodictic knowledge, the process of being authentic ultimately 
leads Heidegger to the realization that any apodictic knowledge we have will always 
beaffectedby the everyday world. While Husserl saw everydayness as something to 
be cast aside, Heidegger takes it up as the basis of his existential analysis. However, 
Husserl, in his marginal notes to Being and Time, claims that Heidegger’s method 
retains the problem he himself tried to eliminate through the phenomenological 
reduction: a fundamental ontology based on everydayness will never attain a 
“transcendental, philosophical perspective” (Dreyfus & Haugeland 1978, 232) 
because it has not removed the presuppositions of the natural attitude.
Although the form is similar, Husserl’s project is an epistemological one and 
the phenomenological reduction has an existentiellj rather than an existential, 
function. (Theunissen 1984, 188) Husserl was concerned with how we come to 
know and the possibility of apodictically certain knowledge, not with an ontology of 
being. The self-responsibility that Husserl speaks of in the Cartesian Meditations is 
an epistemological idea of responsibility, where Heidegger’s authenticity is a form of 
ontological responsibility. For Heidegger, epistemology and the study of human 
cognition are not the fundamental issues of philosophy, especially since he maintains 
that our primary mode of interacting with the world is practical, rather than cognitive. 
Although Heidegger may have been influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology, he 
would still considered his project to be lacking a focus on the question of being.
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Although there are parallels to authenticity in the works o f Husserl, 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, Heidegger's main criticism is their lack of ontological 
concern; they all ignore the ‘question of the meaning of being.’ For a proper 
account of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, it is absolutely necessary to situate it 
within the context of his project of fundamental ontology. I will now turn to an 
examination of fundamental ontology and the existential analysis of Dasein.
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2. Dasein, Average Everydayness, and Inauthenticity
2.1 An Overview of the Question of Being
In Being and Time, Heidegger is attempting to address the question of the 
meaning of being. What does it mean ‘to be’? What is ‘being’? Generally, he 
believes that Plato and Aristotle had a proper understanding of being, but for later 
philosophy, it “ceased to be heard as a thematic question o f  actual investigation.” 
(SZ 2) None of the philosophers after Plato and Aristotle cared to pay any attention 
to what ‘being’ means, seeing it as a universal and empty concept that everyone 
supposedly understands already, and for which a definition would be impossible and 
unneccessary. (SZ 2) This is an enormous mistake, says Heidegger, and has led to a 
philosophical tradition with an incorrect conception of ontology. He proposes to take 
up the question of the meaning of being in an attempt to finally give an appropriate 
and correct formulation of ontology.
The quest to understand the question of the meaning of being leads to Dasein, 
or human being, since questioning or inquiry is one of the ways in which Dasein can 
exist. Essentially, since Dasein is able to ask the question, we must first understand 
the being of Dasein as something that questions, in order to understand the question 
itself. The fact that only Dasein can ask this question means that it is the only being 
that understands ‘being’, the only one with some sort of grasp of what it means ‘to 
be,’ which Heidegger calls a pre-ontological understanding of being. In his attempt 
to unearth the meaning of all being, he uses Dasein as his starting point precisely 
because “understanding o f  being is itself a determination o f being o f  Dasein. The 
ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological” (SZ 12) Dasein is the 
only entity that has the special characteristic of understanding being. Thus, the first
19
task in realizing Heidegger’s project is the existential analysis of Dasein itself in 
order to discern its fundamental ontology.
2.1.1 The Priority of Dasein
We should first examine Heidegger’s controversial claim that an 
understanding of Dasein is necessary in order to understand being. The controversy 
concerns the appropriateness of moving from the question of being to Dasein, and 
whether the argument Heidegger presents is valid. Heidegger believes that an 
analysis of the existential structures of Dasein is a necessary first step in addressing 
the question of being, but many critics question whether this is correct. We will 
examine various criticisms of Heidegger’s argument and see if it can be salvaged.
Heidegger’s argument that being can only be understood by an analysis of 
that which understands being commits what Grossmann calls the ‘epistemological 
fallacy.’ This argument is similar to the claim that, for example, in order to 
understand frogs, we must first understand the being that understands frogs—that 
before frogs can be analyzed, we must analyze Dasein’s understanding. This 
analogy makes Heidegger’s claim seem unreasonable. However, the argument can 
be made valid if the premise is introduced that there is something special about the 
relationship between Dasein and being, namely that Dasein’s understanding of being 
somehow influences or determines being. (Grossmann 1984, 153) If Dasein’s 
understanding itself determines being, then this determination must be examined in 
order to properly understand being. Philipse also refers to this problem inherent in 
Heidegger’s argument, and offers a similar solution that attaches a transcendental 
theme to Being and Time. A transcendental argument has two aspects: first, the 
claim that some sort of subjective condition is needed in order to experience beings,
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then, that these conditions “specify the necessary conditions that these entities must 
satisfy in order to be, in the sense of being accessible to us.” (Philipse 1998, 122) 
Heidegger differentiates between the everyday concept of a phenomenon, as 
objectively present entities, and the phenomenological concept of a phenomenon as 
‘"what already shows itself in appearances prior to and always accompanying what 
we commonly understand as phenomena.” (SZ 31) The phenomenological method 
requires an examination of the latter type of phenomena, rather than the former. 
Heidegger calls the Kantian forms of intution, space and time, the phenomena of 
phenomenology (SZ 31), as that which underlies and presupposes empirical beings, 
and makes our understanding of them possible. (Philipse 1998, 122) Continuing the 
parallel with Kant, who held that space and time were the subjective conditions 
necessary for experiencing phenomena, and that these forms of intuition are the 
conditions the phenomena must satisfy in order to be available to us, we can attribute 
to Dasein’s understanding of being the role of the condition needed to experience 
phenomena and to being itself the role of the condition the phenomena must satisfy 
to be accessible. (Philipse 1998, 122)1 Frede offers a similar solution to the problem. 
She believes that Heidegger’s argument for the priority of Dasein is valid, since 
Dasein is the only entry point available from which to begin an analysis of being. 
Dasein’s understanding is the only understanding of being we have, and the only 
sense of being we can have is therefore affected by our understanding of it. (Frede 
1993, 55) Generally, the only way to make sense of Heidegger’s argument is to 
—1 > insert the premise that being is directly influenced by Dasein’s understanding of it,
1 Philipse speaks o f  ‘subjective’ conditions, although this is not really applicable to Heidegger, who 
attempted to do away with the subject-object distinction. It may be more appropriate to refer to 
phenomenological phenomena as the a priori conditions that underlie objectively present phenomena.
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and this being the case, it is obvious that an analysis of Dasein’s understanding of 
being is a necessary first step in understanding being.
Philipse introduces another problem: why should an understanding of the 
being of Dasein provide a fundamental ontology applicable to all beings? Can the 
being of Dasein be the same as, for instance, the being of frogs? There seems, at first, 
nothing inherently special about the being of Dasein that would explain its privileged 
place as the basis for Heidegger’s ontology. Dasein does have certain ‘ontical 
priorities,’ or priorities over other beings in its facticity, namely it is concerned with 
being, including not only its own being, but “the understanding of something like 
‘world’ and the understanding of the being of beings accessible within the world.” 
(SZ 13) Dasein’s other ontic priority is its existence, its choice of the possibilities in 
its life and its “manner of seizing upon or neglecting such possibilities.” (SZ 13) 
This gives priority because no other beings have the ability to determine their being 
through choice. Philipse does not dispute the ontic priority of Dasein, but questions 
the assumption Heidegger seems to make that this gives Dasein ontological priority 
as well: “The ontic privileges of Dasein do not imply its ontological primacy, and 
from the fact that Dasein is that author of ontology and science it does not follow that 
Dasein should be its privileged topic.” (Philipse 1998, 44) The transcendental theme 
that Philipse presented earlier, however, serves to explain why Dasein has priority 
over other beings: since Dasein is that through which being becomes accessible, it 
only makes sense that the ontology of Dasein is fundamental ontology. (Philipse 
1998, 123)
Grossmann points out another assumption that Heidegger makes. Given that 
knowledge of Dasein’s understanding of being is required, he must justify his 
assumption that because Dasein’s understanding is part of what it means to be Dasein,
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we must first know what it means to be Dasein in order to comprehend the 
understanding of Dasein. (Grossman 1984, 153) In essence, Grossmann takes issue 
with Heidegger’s claim that to understand part of something, one must understand 
the whole. This issue can be fairly easily resolved. Things like understanding, 
questioning, and choosing are “constitutive attitudes of inquiry and are thus 
themseves modes of being.” (SZ 7) The ability of Dasein to ask questions, choose 
information and gain understanding are ways of being that are characteristic 
exclusively of Dasein. In order to understand these modes of being, we must 
understand what it means to be a mode of being of Dasein, which necessitates an 
understanding of the being of Dasein.
The last issue we will address concerning Heidegger’s focus on Dasein is its 
similarity (or dissimilarity) to Husserl’s transcendental ego. Heidegger did not agree 
with Husserl’s idea that the transcendental ego could be reached by bracketing the 
world, and that apodictic knowledge could only be reached through this ego. The 
Husserlian transcendental ego is the pure ‘I,’ detached from the world; Heidegger 
disagreed that the self could be understood as removed from its world, and also 
opposed Husserl’s intentionality, which held that the primary mode of understanding 
and interacting with the world is cognition. However, Heidegger had to come to 
grips with the nature of human being as the entity that has a concern for being, while 
maintaining the importance of the world, and thus he introduces Dasein. (Frede 1993, 
54) Similarly, Philipse acknowledges that Heidegger’s priority o f Dasein can be seen 
as parallel to, and a criticism of, Husserl’s idea of the transcendental ego. (Philipse 
1998, 42) The concept of Dasein, or ‘there-being’ literally translated from the 
German, emphasizes Dasein’s nature as a being that is in the world. We see the 
similarities between Heidegger and Husserl in their emphasis on a human being, in
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some form, as having priority over other beings. The difference lies in the ability of 
human being to be detached from its world. Husserl argues that the transcendental 
ego can exist independently of the world, while for Heidegger there is no possibility 
of Dasein somehow breaking free from the world, since Dasein’s being is always 
being-in-the-world. Before we can look at being-in-the-world, it will be helpful to 
examine the phenomenological method Heidegger uses in his analysis.
2.1.2 Heidegger’s Method: Phenomenology
Heidegger begins his existential analysis of Dasein with the way it is in 
everyday life, however, in order to properly understand why Heidegger chooses 
average everydayness as his starting point, it will be first necessary to give an outline 
of his phenomenological method. In Being and Time's Introduction, section 7, 
Heidegger gives an overview of his conception of phenomenology. He is writing in 
response to phenomenology as developed by Husserl. Athough Heidegger does not 
explicitly criticize Husserl, and mentions him only a few times in Being and Time, 
Heidegger intentionally deviates from Husserlian phenomenology a great deal, 
although there remain some aspects that are common to both accounts. We see a 
deviation from Husserl in Heidegger’s notion of phenomenology, the main feature of 
which is Heidegger’s rejection of the phenomenological reduction and transcendental 
ego. (Kockelmans 1967, 273)
Husserl’s phenomenology focuses on ‘bracketing’ the natural attitude, in 
which all natural and physical sciences, and indeed the world itself, are put aside and 
not used as premises for philosophizing. The purpose of this exercise is to set aside 
all unquestioned assumptions, and to build a philosophy that is built entirely upon 
premises that are apodictically certain. By bracketing the world, Husserl arrives at a
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transcendental ego, but Heidegger rejects the idea that the self can be separated from 
the world in this manner, considering it to be a form of Cartesianism that Husserl 
does not escape. Heidegger’s concept of pre-ontological understanding means that 
Dasein always already has an understanding of being even before it develops an 
ontology. Dasein understands itself first and foremost in terms of the world, as a 
being that relates to the world that surrounds it. Furthermore, while Husserl sees the 
self s relation with the world mainly in terms of cognition and perception, as a 
subject-object relation wherein the T  perceives the world, Heidegger believes that 
Dasein engages with the world in a manner that is principally concerned with living 
its life in the midst of the world, as is thus caught up with the everyday aspects of 
this life including mood, cares, and possibilities. (Moran 2000, 228) Cognition is a 
function that arises on top of our pre-ontological ability to deal with equipment in 
the world, not as not our primary mode of dealing with the world, as Husserl 
believed it to be. Dasein encounters beings in the world in a practical way, as objects 
that are used in order to perform a specific task (the for-sake-of-which). Dasein 
determines these objects in terms o f the role they play in the task it seeks to 
undertake; for instance, in hammering a nail, we understand the hammer as that 
which will allow us to pound it into the board, not as a specific instantiation o f the 
concept of ‘hammer.’
Up to a point, Heidegger follows Husserl’s method in refusing to accept 
presuppositions about Dasein's being and reality, and rejecting the sciences precisely 
because they are built upon unquestioned assumptions about being. However, for 
Heidegger, the issue of presuppositions is complex. Although Heidegger does not 
use the Husserlian term ‘phenomenological reduction’ in Being and Time, he does 
use it in the Basic Problems in Phenomenology. In this work, however,he uses it
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differently to mean the process of “leading phenomenological vision back from the 
apprehension of a being...to the understanding o f the being of this being,” 
(Heidegger 1981, 21) rather than Husserl’s process of bracketing the objective world 
in order to arrive at apodictic truths. However, there is a major difference between 
Husserl and Heidegger in terms of the rejection of presuppositions. Heidegger 
speaks, in Being and Time, about a destructuring of ontology that involves rejecting 
the historical account of ontology, “a loosening of the sclerotic tradition and a 
dissolving of the concealments produced by it.” (SZ 22) The philosophical tradition 
has forced ontological interpretations on us that we are unable to question because 
we lack a starting point from which to begin. The proper question of being has been 
unresolved, inadequately formulated, and ultimately forgotten (SZ 21), and as such, 
someone who wanted to inquire into the the meaning of being has nowhere to start 
that is not coloured by the assumptions and concealments of previous metaphysics. 
Heidegger wishes to reject previous accounts of ontology, including those o f Kant 
and Descartes, as well as the current method of treating ontology, because they have 
failed to take into account the proper question of being. This process seems to 
follow the Husserlian mode of eradicating assumptions, but Heidegger realizes the 
impossibility of completely doing away with all presuppositions. Asking the 
question ‘What is being?’ itself involves a presupposition that we have some 
understanding of what it means to be. Any question we ask about being requires an 
interpretation of being based upon some knowledge that we already possess. As 
Mulhall puts it, “we must enter the circle by initiating our enquiry on the basis of 
some pre-conception...and then, when we reach a provisional conclusion, return to 
our starting point with the benefit of a deeper understanding.” (Mulhall 1996, 31) 
This is the hermeneutic circle, which Heidegger says is the “methodological meaning
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of phenomenological description.” (SZ 37) In this sense, then, Heidegger and 
Husserl differ greatly. Husserl believes that it is possible to achieve a viewpoint free 
from assumptionsL while for Heidegger, any starting-point, no matter how 
apodictically certain it may claim to be, is never free from presuppositions. The 
hermeneutic circle embraces this idea, but does so from a critical perspective.
For Heidegger, phenomenology is a method that “does not characterize the 
‘what’ of the objects of philosophical research in terms of their content but the ‘how’ 
of such research.” (SZ 27) He breaks the word down into its constituents, 
phenomenon and logos. Phenomenon means “what shows itself, the self-showing, 
the manifest.” (SZ 28) The usual or common idea of the phenomenon, as that which 
is shown, presupposes a phenomenological concept of the phenomenon. (Dreyfus 
1991, 30) Husserl’s idea of the phenomenon as an appearance to consciousness, 
which indicates the common idea of phenomenon, is dropped by Heidegger. As 
shown earlier, the phenomenological phenomenon is that which accompanies and 
makes possible our experience of objectively present beings, like the Kantian forms 
of intuition, space and time. In the Kantian picture, our experience always takes a 
form that is mediated by the presupposition of space and time, although they are not 
what one would commonly conceive of as phenomena. Logos is taken by Heidegger 
to mean discourse, in the sense of making the object of discourse manifest in speech, 
revealing it as itself through discursive communication. Thus, taken together, 
phenomenology refers to “every way of indicating beings as they show themselves in 
themselves.” (SZ 35) In the context of Being and Time, a phenomenon is that which 
“does not show itself initially and for the most part, something that is concealed” yet 
“at the same time is something that essentially belongs to what initially and for the 
most part shows itself, indeed in such a way that it constitutes its meaning and
27
ground.” (SZ 35) The object of phenomenology is being, as that which has become 
covered over yet remains the ground of phenomena in the usual sense.
The proper task of phenomenology is the interpretation of being, by which 
“the proper meaning of being and the basic structures of the very being of Dasein are 
made known to the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein itself.” (SZ 37) 
Being is the appropriate subject matter for phenomenology as the thing that underlies 
and makes possible experience, but is still concealed and waiting to be disclosed. 
The point of entry into the hermeneutic circle must allow for the disclosure of being 
in an accurate way that does not incorporate the failings of previous ontologies. In 
the philosophical tradition, the state of average everydayness has not been considered 
as an object of proper theoretical investigation, and this is one of the reasons it is an
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appropriate place to entet the hermeneutic circle, since it is untainted with prior 
philosophical conceptions. Furthermore, the nature of average everydayness is such 
that it will allow the ontological structures of Dasein to be disclosed through an 
examination of ontic aspects. It is worth bearing in mind one point that Mulhall 
brings up: Heidegger’s choice of everydayness does not imply that this state is 
inherently more authentic or more valuable than other modes of being such as the 
scientific or theoretical positions. (Mulhall 1996, 19) In terms of methodological 
considerations, however, he did consider everydayness to be more 
phenomenologically significant. Although disciplines such as biology, psychology, 
or anthropology can provide various interpretations of Dasein's being, these fields 
have arrived at their understandings without examining the existential foundations of 
being. Heidegger believes that “positivistic investigation does not see these 
[ontological] foundations and considers them to be self-evident.” (SZ 50) The 
sciences can give us an everyday understanding of being, but there is no guarantee
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that these fields have derived their pictures of being from the genuine truth about 
Dasein rather than from traditional or dogmatic conceptions of human being. 
(Mulhall 1996, 18) In fact, average everydayness is itself characterized by 
inauthenticity, and the next section will deal with the relationship between these two 
ideas. •
2.2 Everydayness and Inauthenticity
2.2.1 Everydayness as a Starting Point for Existential Analysis
Existential analysis is the term Heidegger uses to refer to the analysis of the 
existential or ontological structures that underlie the being of Dasein. These 
fundamental existential properties define Dasein universally, regardless of its 
specific existentiell structure. ‘Existentiell’, or ‘ontic’, refers to the specific 
“possibility of being of each existing Dasein,” (SZ 13) which means the different 
possibilities each individual Dasein has, depending on their specific circumstances in 
the world. Existentiell properties are not ontologically fundamental because they are 
not universal, whereas the existential structures of Dasein belong to each Dasein 
regardless of their particular existentiell situation. However, “the roots of the 
existential analysis, for their part, are ultimately existentiell—they are ontic,” (SZ 13) 
and “only when philosophical research and inquiry themselves are grasped in an 
existentiell way—as a possibility of being of each existing Dasein—does it become 
possible at all to disclose the existentiality of existence.” (SZ 13) The philosophical 
search for the meaning of being is only understood through our existence because it 
is a mode of existence. (SZ 12) The question of being is a question that Dasein asks 
in its everyday, factual, ontic mode of being, but it concerns existential and
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ontological structures. Thus, the possibility of getting at a fundamental ontology 
must go through an ontic or existentiell route.
The appropriate starting point from which to begin the existential analysis of 
Dasein must be in the existentiell aspect of Dasein, and it must not be arbitrary or 
dogmatic. (SZ 16) Every mode of being for Dasein carries with it an implicit pre- 
ontological understanding of being (Mulhall, 17), so every mode can be seen as a 
possible starting point. However, the method of entry into the analysis must be such 
that “the manner of access and interpretation must instead be chosen in such a way 
that this being can show itself to itself on its own terms. And furthermore, this 
manner should show that being as it is initially and fo r  the most part—in its average 
everydayness.” (SZ 16) Thus, Heidegger chooses the average everyday existence of 
Dasein as the entry point for his existential analysis. Generally, however, the state of 
average everydayness has been considered by philosophers to be an unsuitable basis 
for ontological considerations.
Heidegger sets out to clarify the existential basis of Dasein and begins with 
everyday Dasein precisely because traditional philosophy tends to pass over it. As 
such, the state of everydayness is unlikely to be tainted with the traditional 
philosophical misconceptions that Heidegger is so anxious to avoid. Philosophy 
ignores average everydayness because it is ontically closest to us—it is the state 
accessible to us immediately, yet “what is ontically nearest and familiar is 
ontologically the farthest, unrecognized and constantly overlooked in its ontological 
significance.” (SZ 43) Our everyday state, as what is immediately accessible, is 
taken for granted as mere absorption with what is in the world and is overlooked as a 
source of existential importance. For Heidegger, however, the essential structures of 
being can be found in everydayness because “Dasein is concerned with a particular
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mode of its being to which it is related in the way of average everydayness, if  only in 
the way of fleeing from  it and of forgetting //.” (SZ 45) The ontic structures that are 
present in everyday Dasein are not just another aspect of Dasein, but have 
similarities to the ontological structure of authentic Dasein (SZ 44). Thus, if 
Heidegger delineates the structures that are present in average everydayness, he will 
have a sort of structural framework that is applicable to the ontological structures of 
Dasein as well.
2.2.2 The Concept of Inauthenticity in Being and Time
Heidegger’s first mention of inauthenticity in Being and Time occurs in 
Section 9, “The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein.” One of the features o f being 
particular to Dasein is its ‘mineness’ or ‘ownness’ (Jemeinigkeit). This means that 
Dasein always recognizes itself as having its own being, in contrast to objectively 
present objects that do not have this understanding. Dasein understands itself as 
being itself rather than something or someone else, and as having possibilities that 
belong solely to itself. Authenticity and inauthenticity are two kinds of being related 
to this characteristic of mine-ness. Heidegger goes into more detail in Chapter II, 
where he elaborates on the idea that “Mineness belongs to existing Dasein as the 
condition of the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity. Dasein exists always 
in one of these modes, or else in the modal indifference to them.” (SZ 53) There is 
some controversy over this passage and the claim that there seem to be in fact three 
modes of existence, although Heidegger never really discusses what it means to be 
indifferent Dasein. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Heidegger thinks that our average everyday understanding of being is 
inauthentic and that “Dasein tends to understand its own being in terms of that being
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to which it is essentially, continually, and most closely related—the ‘world,’” (SZ 
15) rather than understanding its being authentically, on its own terms. By 
everydayness, Heidegger refers to the state that Dasein is in “initially and for the 
most part,” (SZ 16) in which a pre-ontological conception of being is always present.
That is to say, in everyday existence, Dasein has some idea of what it means ‘to be,’ 
although this idea is not fully made explicit. Averageness is Heidegger’s term for the 
“everyday indifference of Dasein,” (SZ 43) meaning the state where Dasein is 
undifferentiated in terms of its existence—it does not know the difference between 
authentic and inauthentic existence. In our average everyday lives, we are absorbed 
with the world, yet we have an implicit idea of being that enables us to understand ^  f L 
the world. A proper understanding of why average everydayness is inauthentic 
requires a closer examination of Heidegger's concept of world and Dasein’s being as 
being-in-the-world.
2.2.3 Being-in-the-world and Mitdasein
Chapter III of Being and Time contains a discussion of the phenomenon of 
world. World can be used in a variety of different contexts, both ontic and 
ontological. In one ontic sense, world is our usual usage of the term: “the totality of 
beings which can be objectively present within the world.” (SZ 64) Ontologically, 
world can refer to the being of objectively present beings or to a particular region 
that encompasses many beings; Heidegger gives the example of the ‘world’ of 
mathematics referring to a region of all possible mathematical objects. Another ontic 
meaning, but one with a pre-ontological and existentiell sense, defines world as “that 
‘/« which’ a factical Dasein ‘lives.’” (SZ 64) This can refer to the public world or 
surrounding world in which one carries out one’s existence, and we can see this as a
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pre-cursor to Heidegger’s world of the They {das Man). In Chapter IV, Heidegger 
takes the phenomenon of world and discusses what it means for Dasein to be in-the- 
world.
Heidegger is offering a formulation of Dasein’s relation to the world from an 
involved rather than a detached perspective. Dasein is always absorbed in the world, 
and part of this world involves the existence of other Dasein. One’s interaction with 
‘things at hand,’ or material objects, implies the existence of other humans. 
Heidegger gives examples of walking alongside a field which is seen to belong to a 
specific person, or a book which was sold by another specific person, and so on. (SZ 
118) Dasein’s encounters with its surrounding physical world always point to the 
existence of others, and “the world is always already the one I share with the others. 
The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is a being-with others.” (SZ 118) 
Dasein is ‘thrown’ into a world that always refers to others, whether or not they are 
physically there. Being-with-others is not confined to literally being in the physical 
presence of others. Even if I were the last person on earth, I would still be-with 
{Mitdasein) others in the sense that all of the physical objects I encounter refer to 
others, perhaps in a relation of belonging or being made by or even just being 
available for others to encounter, since “ ‘things’ are encountered from the world in 
which they are at hand for the others.” (SZ 118) This world, populated and 
influenced by others, is the world in which Dasein always already finds itself, and it 
is specifically through encounters in the world that Dasein gets a notion of the other. 
Dasein does not formulate an idea of the other in isolation from the world, simply by 
examining the self and extrapolating, as Husserl thought was possible. Rather, 
Heidegger says that “[others] are not encountered by first looking at oneself and then 
ascertaining the opposite pole of a distinction. They are encountered from the world
33
in which Dasein...essentially dwells.” (SZ 119) Furthermore, by ‘others,’ Heidegger 
refers to “those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among 
whom one is, too,” (SZ 118) and there is a sense of an inclusive group to which 
Dasein belongs. For Heidegger, the physical world and references to other Dasein 
are inseparable.
Heidegger believes that it is always the case that Dasein is with-others. It 
would seem that an existence of complete isolation seems to disprove his point. It is 
possible that an individual could be bom and live out his entire life without contact 
with other humans, so it does not seem necessary, as Heidegger claims, that Dasein’s 
existence need always be with others. However, Heidegger points out that an 
isolated existence is only an ontic possibility—a factical case of a particular Dasein. 
Being-with, on the other hand, is an existential-ontological characteristic that 
pertains to all Dasein, regardless of its factical situation. Being-with applies to the 
existence of the Dasein alone on a desert island as much as to the Dasein in the midst 
of a crowd, and “being-alone is a deficient mode of being-with.” (SZ 120) It is only 
because Dasein is with-others that it can be alone : “the other can be lacking only in 
and fo r  a being-with.” (SZ 120) Mulhall points out that the idea of being-with is 
necessary, because without being-with, it would be impossible for Dasein to 
encounter others in a comprehensible way. (Mulhall 1996, 66) The condition of our 
having intelligible encounters with others is having being-with as an existential- 
ontological structure.
There are various counter-arguments one might propose to Heidegger’s claim
that Dasein is always with-others. The objects on an uninhabited island do not seem
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to carry with them the same meanings of others. A person stranded on this island 
does not see the palm trees as belonging to another person, or the coconuts as picked
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by another person; there are no references to others simply because others have never 
dealt with these particular objects. Heidegger might claim that being-with is still 
present, since the stranded person brings with him ideas about how to deal with the 
palm trees and coconuts that were instilled in him during his time in civilization. But 
what if this isolated individual had been bom and spent his entire life on the island, 
without ever coming into contact with other humans? In this case, it seems, there can 
be no being-with-others in his interaction with the world because the concept of the 
other is utterly foreign to him. In this case, how can this individual be said to be 
alone in a deficient mode of being-with-others? Take the example of a child raised 
in the woods by wolves: often such children have no comprehension of other 
individuals and are not capable of intelligible interaction with other humans. Perhaps 
Heidegger would argue that such children cannot be considered Dasein precisely 
because they have no sense of being-with-others. However, after being brought into 
society, these children often leam to communicate with others, at least at a 
rudimentary level. Either this suggests that being-with-others was always already a 
part of the child’s being, or that it is possible to move from non-Dasein to Dasein. 
This second possibility raises another set of questions about the distinction between 
animals and humans: higher primates that leam to communicate through sign 
language can be seen to have some concern about their own being. Can they be 
called Dasein?
In any case, Heidegger examines the aspects of the world to which Dasein 
relates in its average everydayness, and in asking the question “Who is everyday 
Dasein?,” concludes that Dasein, because its being is being-in-the-world, necessarily 
interacts with others and is influenced and shaped by them. By others he does not 
mean just other individual human beings, but also the ideas and norms that are
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determined by society, which includes the totality of individuals, yet is something 
more. In Chapter IV of Being and Time, he says that since Dasein encounters its 
own being in a world that is filled with others, and is concerned and absorbed by 
others and the world rather than its own being, Dasein is not properly itself in this 
context. Because we are surrounded by others all the time, we are constantly aware 
of what they are doing, how we differ from them, and in what ways our self might be 
inferior or just different; this is an existential characteristic of Dasein that Heidegger 
calls distantiality: “In taking care of the things which one has taken hold of, for, and 
against others, there is constant care as to the way one differs from then, whether this 
difference is to be equalized, whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind others 
and wants to catch up in relation to them...Being-with-one-another is, unknown to 
itself, disquieted about the care about this distance.” (SZ 126) Heidegger says that 
distantiality comes from the fact that being-with-one-another as such creates 
averageness, an existential characteristic of the They (SZ 127). The They is 
concerned with averageness insofar as it deems what is proper and what is allowed 
for us in our particular society, the norms and customs that define our society. 
Everything we encounter in our daily lives is the repetition and similarity that orders 
our lives in which “every other is like the next.” (SZ 126) Heidegger refers to public 
transportation and the use of information services as examples in which this is the 
case. It is impossible to use either without some clue as to the average actions that 
one must perform in, for example, riding the train. We must know at some pre- 
ontological level that it is necessary to buy a ticket, show the ticket, wait for the train, 
maintain decorum, etc. in order to perform the action of using public transportation. 
Although this may create averageness it is also important to remember that only 
through these similarities and shared experiences that intelligibility can exist.
Without the similar experiences and norms that surround public transportation, chaos 
would result and no shared public meaning would exist. If, as Heidegger claims, all 
intelligibility comes from social context, then a certain degree of averageness is 
necessary.
Heidegger concludes that as humans we always find ourselves existing in 
what can be described as a public context. It is important to note, however, that 
Heidegger never explicitly uses terms such as ‘social context’ or ‘cultural norms,’ 
and that this is more a matter of interpretation. For instance, Dreyfus in his Being-in- 
the-World, frequently refers to “public norms” (Dreyfus 1996, 151; 153) as the 
normal ways of acting to which one is expected to conform, dictated by the They. It 
seems appropriate to attribute a social quality to the world, insofar as for Heidegger 
intelligibility requires shared meaning. However, calling these shared social 
meaning norms implies that there is a reference to how one ought to act. Dreyfus’ 
Wittgensteinian interpretation attributes this idea o f norms to Heidegger, a claim 
which I will examine in depth later. In any case, I believe that the world as 
Heidegger describes it can be safely called a social context, in the sense that it is an 
intersubjective environment with shared meaning.
2.2.4 The They (das Man)
The shared practices that give intelligibility also have a less favourable side. 
Dasein’s concern for things and others in the world means that any difference 
between Dasein and others becomes evident; Heidegger calls this “constant care as to 
the way one differs from them...whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind 
others” (SZ 126) distantiality. The care Dasein has about oneself and others proves 
to be a dangerous thing, because it allows for Dasein to become subservient to
37
‘others.’ By others, Heidegger is referring the idea of the They {das Man). He 
delineates several characteristics that will be helpful to examine in order to give a 
better idea of this rather vague concept.
The They has several ways of being, which Heidegger calls publicness; these 
include distantiality, averageness, and levelling down. Distantiality, as mentioned 
before, consists in the care about the distance between oneself and others. 
Averageness is, in a factical sense, the idea o f propriety and what is allowed. 
Levelling down occurs when everything primordial and exceptional is squashed 
down to the level of the average, and then re-absorbed. Taken together, these three 
characteristics ensure that anything out of the ordinary is brought down to an average 
level, precisely because Dasein wishes to maintain its sameness to others as much as 
possible. These aspects of the They have various repurcussions for the being of 
Dasein, since Dasein is always absorbed within the They. First, it takes Dasein’s 
responsibility for making decisions away—Dasein need not take any responsibilities 
for its decisions because they can be blamed on the They, since Dasein's choices can 
be determined only from options that are available from what the They construes as 
appropriate. What I do in situation can be justified as ‘what one does’ in such a 
situation, and this results in a disburdening of Dasein’s everydayness—by relieving 
Dasein of the need to be accountable for its actions and decisions, the They 
“accommodates Dasein in its tendency to take things easily and make them easily.” 
(SZ 128) Because of this disburdening, Dasein has no real incentive to act in such a 
way that does not give over all its responsibility to the They, thus perpetuating its 
domination of the everyday world.
But can the They be more precisely described than through reference to a few 
of its characteristics? The They is not an objectively present entity, and one cannot
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pick out its physical presence because it does not have one. But although it does not 
have physical objective presence, it is not nothing—it still exists. Heidegger does not 
really give an adequate explanation of what it is, rather he tries to say what it isn’t. 
The They is not the “objective presence of several subjects,” it is not the sum total of 
various subjects; one could collect every single individual in the entire history of the 
world, and one would still not have a grasp on the They. At the other extreme, the 
They could be conceived of as a “universal subject” that reigns over a plurality of 
subjects. This conception of the They is incompatible with the idea of the subject as 
Dasein, since it tends to interpret the subject as an objectively present instance of the 
genus of human being, but the They is not of the same genus as human being, nor is 
it a characteristic of individual human being. (SZ 128-129) This idea of the They 
also has ontological roots in the idea of objective presence. However, Heidegger is 
quite clear that the They is not an objective presence, and he attempts to solve the 
problem of describing exactly what it is by claiming that the They is an existential, 
and “belongs as a primordial phenomenon to the positive constitution o f Dasein.” 
(SZ 129). It manifests itself in various ways through Dasein. The They is not a being, 
nor is it a collection of beings. It is a fundamental existential characteristic of Dasein 
involving the way it interacts with others in the world.
Heidegger claims that Dasein is not its real self when it is immersed in the 
They. Given that our average everyday life is exclusively comprised of decisions 
and actions made with the influence of the They, we are not our ‘real selves’ in this 
state of average everydayness. Heidegger here differentiates between the everyday, 
inauthentic They-self of Dasein and the authentic self, which has ‘found’ itself and 
explicitly grasped its being. Dasein is ‘lost’ in the They in its average everydayness, 
and to be its real self it must extricate itself from the grasp of the They. In Chapter IV,
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however, he describes only the characteristics of the inauthentic self. What does it 
mean to not be one’s real self? For Heidegger, it means being in the mode of the 
They—one’s possibilities and responsibilities are given to oneself in terms of the 
They. For many scholars of Heidegger’s thought, including Dreyfus and Rubin, the 
claim that we are not our real selves in our average everydayness presents a large 
problem: if all intelligibility is a result of the They, how can Dasein be anything else 
but inauthentic? Such issues will be addressed in Chapter 4.
2.2.5 Entanglement and Falling Prey
Heidegger examines three existential characteristics of the They that 
constitute Dasein’s being of everydayness: idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity; these 
characteristics reveal the entanglement of Dasein, or the fact that Dasein is in and 
together with the world. By idle talk, Heidegger is referring to “the mode o f being of 
the understanding and interpretation of everyday Dasein,” (SZ 167) a form of 
groundless discourse in which the subject of conversation is understood only in a 
superficial way, but as a universal superficiality that ensures everyone understands 
what is being said by virtue of this shared averageness. Curiosity is the tendency to 
see things without interpreting or understanding them; it describes the desire to see 
new things for the sake of novelty, but without a desire to gain a deeper knowledge 
than is readily available through cursory examination. Ambiguity involves the 
inability to “decide what is disclosed in genuine understanding and what is not,” (SZ 
173) which comes about because everything is accessible to all, and everyone has a 
superficial opinion about everything (i.e. the product of idle talk and curiosity). It 
prevents us from seeing things clearly and “passes off talking about things ahead of 
time and curious guessing as what is really happening, and stamps carrying things
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out and taking action as something subsequent and of no importance.” (SZ 174) 
These three characteristics are all intertwined with each other, and from this 
interconnection we get entanglement. Entanglement in itself, however, is not 
necessarily a negative thing, despite the language Heidegger uses to describe its 
characteristics and the generally disparaging descriptions of being immersed in the 
They. Heidegger repeatedly claims, however, that these terms should not be taken in 
a disparaging sense: “the expression ‘idle talk’ is not used here in a disparaging 
sense,” (SZ 167) and “the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify a ‘lesser’ being or 
a ‘lower’ degree of being,” (SZ 43) although this is difficult to reconcile with the 
bluntness and negative connotations of the language he uses. There are further 
implications concerning reasons why we should even attempt to be authentic, given 
that there is no sort of greater value in being authentic than in remaining entangled in 
the They. There is a great deal of controversy in the secondary literature about the 
positive and negative aspects of the They, and I will address this in Chapter 4.
Having already examined entanglement on an ontic-existentiell level, it must 
now be considered at an ontological-existential level. Falling prey is the existential 
characteristic of Dasein that corresponds to entanglement. Falling prey means falling 
prey to the ‘world,’ away from one’s real self, and Heidegger explicitly defines it as 
“being absorbed in being-with-one-another as it is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and 
ambiguity.” (SZ 175) Here he brings in the concept of inauthenticity and defines it 
with reference to falling prey; inauthenticity in this sense is a kind of being-in-the- 
world that is “completely taken in by the world and the Mitda-sein of the others in 
the they.” (SZ 176) This being is absorbed in the world and others around it, and has 
fallen away from itself and into the world. Claims of this sort are difficult to make 
sense of, given that the world defines and gives intelligibility to us; how can our
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‘real’ selves exist independently of the world? The structure of falling prey displays 
various characteristics: temptation, tranquilization, alienation and self-entanglement. 
Being-in-the-world is tempting because it allows Dasein to take the easy route of 
having its decisions made by the They and renouncing any responsibility for its own 
decisions. The tranquilizing nature of the They comes about because “idle talk and 
ambiguity, having-seen-everything and having-understood-everything, develop the 
supposition that the disclosedness of Dasein thus available and prevalent could 
guarantee to Dasein the certainty, genuineness, and fullness of all the possibilities of 
its being.” (SZ 177) Dasein comes to believe that the They fulfils all of its 
possibilities, that there is nothing beyond the everyday world to strive for, and thus is 
content with its situation. Being-in-the-world is alienating insofar as it causes Dasein 
to think that it understands everything, when in fact it lacks a real understanding of 
its own potentiality-of-being; the dominance of the They means that “fundamentally 
it remains undetermined and unasked what is then really to be understood.. .[Dasein] 
drifts toward an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-being is concealed.” 
(SZ 178) Finally, the alienation of being-in-the-world causes Dasein to revert to 
self-entanglement, a kind of self-examination in which it tries to force itself into 
various ‘typologies,’ intent on fitting itself into a certain group and thus adopting the 
distinctive characteristics of that group: “This alienation drives Dasein into a kind of 
being intent upon the most exaggerated ‘self-dissection’ which tries out all kinds of 
possibilities of interpretation,” (SZ 178) with the end result that Dasein is closed off 
from its authentic self and trapped in inauthenticity.
Taken together, these four characteristics mean that Dasein has always 
already lost its real self to the world—this means that from the beginning of its 
existence Dasein is surrounded by and has surrendered its autonomy and
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individuality to the They. Such is the case for every Dasein, everyday, unless it 
makes the effort to extricate itself, and lead what Heidegger calls an authentic life. 
However, Dasein is unlikely to break out of its inauthentic state because being-in- 
the-world and entanglement are both tempting and tranquilizing. The nature of idle 
talk and ambiguity is such that it makes Dasein feel as if he has seen everything and 
understood everything—this “self-certainty and decisiveness of the they” (SZ 177) 
makes Dasein feel as though he is already living a genuine life where all possibilities 
are open, certain and full (SZ 177). As a result o f this tranquilization, Dasein 
absorbs itself in its activities and the world, constantly making itself busy with 
something. In the present day we see perfect evidence of this, but Dasein fails to 
realize that it does not understand the fundamentals about what is really to be 
understood. In this examination of falling prey we can see the self-obsession and 
self-examination characteristic of the modem age.
Having laid out the main characteristics o f the being of the ‘there’ by 
discussing the ontological structure of disclosedness (constituted in attunement, 
understanding and discourse) and of the everyday way of being (characterized by 
idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity), which shows the movement of falling prey 
(characterized by temptation, tranquilization, alienation and self-entanglement), 
Heidegger has provided the phenomenal basis for the totality of the existential 
constitution of Dasein, but still lacks an existential and ontological basis for this 
structure. (SZ 180) That is, Heidegger has explained the phenomena that constitute 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world, but he must find the basic ontological structures that 
unite these phenomena and Dasein’s being. Since Dasein is the being that 
understands its own being, he must find the ontological structure that allows Dasein 
to disclose its own being to itself. This is part of the task of the existential analytic of
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uncovering the ontology of Dasein, and here he searches for the primordial 
characteristic that discloses Dasein's being to itself Once this characteristic is found, 
Heidegger will have attained the “primordial totality of being of Dasein,” the 
existential-ontological basis for the whole of Dasein. A phenomenal origin is 
necessary for Heidegger’s method, and he believes he has found it in the 
phenomenon of Angst, or anxiety, a form of attunement. There must be something 
distinctive about anxiety, if it is able to disclose Dasein's being to itself. The 
phenomenon of entanglement, in which Dasein flees from itself and authenticity, and 
immerses itself in inauthenticity and the They, is used as the phenomenal basis for 
his analysis of anxiety. In searching for what discloses Dasein to itself, entanglement 
does not seem like the appropriate phenomenal foundation since it seems to turn 
Dasein away from itself rather than bringing Dasein before itself. However, 
entanglement is suitable for this purpose since, at an existentiell level, it involves a 
repression and turning away from the self; existentially, this very flight from itself 
reveals that there is something there to be fled from. Existentielly and ontically, 
Dasein does not understand from what it is fleeing and appears closed off to itself, 
but existential and ontological examination allows us to see that precisely because 
Dasein is brought before itself in this process it is able to flee from itself. 
Furthermore, entanglement is also an appropriate phenomenal basis because the 
interpretation is least likely here to “be surrendered to an artificial self conception of 
Dasein.” (SZ 185)
The next chapter will address Heidegger’s attempt to delineate the totality of 
ontological and existential structures that underlie Dasein’s being as being-in-the- 
world- and being-with-others. He has discussed the existentiell and existential
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structures that make up the being of everyday Dasein, but they are still very much 
disparate elements. As we saw earlier, Heidegger wants a cohesive account of 
Dasein’s being, which requires the unification of these distinct aspects. He 
introduces care as the structural totality of Dasein, and investigates the ontological 
structures that make it possible for Dasein to understand its being as a totality.
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3. Angst, Authenticity and Death
3.1 Angst and Care
Heidegger’s preparatory account of the existential analytic has given an 
account of Dasein as a being that exists in the world, but an analysis that will give 
the primordial structure that underlies everyday existence is still needed, since 
Heidegger’s primary aim in the analysis of Dasein is that of a fundamental ontology 
of human being. There is no single primordial ground from which the existential 
characteristics of Dasein can be derived, but it will be possible to discern several 
different equiprimordial characteristics that are all equally fundamental and 
interdependent with each other. Heidegger will show that the “primordial totality of 
being of Dasein” (SZ 182) is care, and that Angst is the phenomenon through which 
Dasein can come to understand this totality of being. Authentic existence can only 
come about through this disclosure.
In order to ascertain the equiprimordial characteristics of Dasein, Heidegger 
must analyze being-in-as-such, or what it means to ‘be in’ something. That is, he 
must explain the ‘there’ (Da) of Dasein, the fact that Dasein always finds itself in the 
world, in order to understand the being that is in the ‘there.’ Attunement and 
understanding are the two equiprimordial ways of being in the ‘there,’ and constitute 
the disclosure of being to Dasein. Only attunement and understanding disclose 
Dasein’s being as essentially in-the-world, although Dasein has a tendency to evade 
this disclosure. Angst is a unique form of attunement because it discloses being-in- 
the-world in such a way that Dasein can access authentic being. Heidegger will 
return to the phenomenon of everyday life to apply the concepts of attunement and 
understanding to Dasein’s average everydayness, since this is the thematic point of 
departure and rightfully it must be integrated with the primordial concepts.
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3.1.1 Attunement and Understanding
Attunement (.Befindlichkeit) is another problematic word in terms of 
translation. Stambaugh, in her translation of Being and Time, chooses this translation, 
but points out that ‘disposition’ is also an appropriate choice. She opts instead for 
attunement in order to avoid any ‘psychological connotations.’ Dreyfus calls it 
affectedness, and MacQuarrie and Robinson’s previous translation of Being and 
Time used ‘state-of-mind.’ State-of-mind is probably the most inaccurate translation, 
since attunement is neither a state one finds oneself in, nor anything having to do 
with the mind. ‘Attunement’ captures the sense of directedness towards the world 
that characterizes Heidegger’s account.
Attunement is an ontological structure that corresponds, at the ontic level, to 
the concept of ‘mood.’ Moods disclose the world to Dasein in a certain way; when I 
am in a bad mood, for instance, the world seems to me hateful or unbearable, and I 
direct myself towards the world based on this disclosure. However, “the possibilities 
of disclosure belonging to cognition fall far short of the primordial disclosure of 
moods in which Dasein is brought before its being as the there.” (SZ 134) Heidegger 
believes that mood discloses the world in a more fundamental way than our cognition 
does, and we can see in this claim a clear divergence from the Husserlian picture. 
Mood, as attunement, discloses Dasein’s being to itself as being in the ‘there,’ but 
this does not mean that Dasein acknowledges or is even conscious of the disclosure. 
However, the very fact that Dasein evades the disclosure of its being shows that there 
is something there to evade, and this is, on an ontological level, the fact that Dasein 
exists in the ‘there’, or what Heidegger calls ‘thrownness.’
Thrownness is the “facticity o f  its being delivered over.” (SZ 135) Facticity 
“implies that an ‘innerworldly’ being has being-in-the-world in such a way that it can
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understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the being of those beings which it 
encounters within its own world.” (SZ 56) Objectively present things, however, can 
have ‘brute facts’ of their existence, but do not understand themselves as existing 
within the context of a surrounding world (or indeed understand themselves at all). 
Thrownness refers to the fact of Dasein's being caught up in the world, that Dasein 
exists always in a given world with certain pre-determined situations that it finds 
itself ‘thrown’ into, and which determine the choices it can make. Mood shows 
being-in-the-world because it determines to what Dasein directs itself, in that Dasein 
cares about things in a particular way depending on its mood, and can affect Dasein 
in such a way as to alter its moods. One’s mood “has always already disclosed 
being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself toward 
something.” (SZ 137) The evasion that characterizes attunement ontologically does 
not disclose the thrownness of being directly, but in the fact that Dasein turns away 
from it. Dasein evades the disclosure of being-in-the-world that moods provide, and 
this is part of being inauthentic. We can think of thrownness as the way Dasein is in- 
the-world, disclosed by attunement.
The other structure o f being in the ‘there’ is understanding, the 
equiprimordial counterpart of attunement. In our everyday life, we think of 
understanding as comprehending or being able to do something. The existential 
usage of the term, however, refers to the possibilities that Dasein has in its existence. 
While attunement disclosed Dasein as thrown into the world, understanding involves 
grasping this being-in-the-world and realizing that Dasein’s possibilities are 
determined entirely through the world: “as essentially attuned, Dasein has always 
already got itself into definite possibilities,” (SZ 144) but as “understanding, it 
‘knows’ what is going on, that is, what its potentiality of being is.” (SZ 144)
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Understanding projects Dasein into its possibilities and “because of the kind of being 
which is constituted by the existential of projecting, Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than 
it actually is... It is existentially that which it is not yet in its potentiality of being.” 
(SZ 145) Dasein’s being includes not just its existence in the present moment, but 
the various possibilities that lie in its future:
Because attunement and understanding are equiprimordial existential 
structures, they affect each other such that understanding is always attuned and 
attunement always has understanding. The possibilities that Dasein understands 
itself to have are always attuned, that is, understood as existing in the context 
inhabited by Dasein. Conversely, the realization that Dasein is being-in-the-world 
always has the understanding that, as such, Dasein can project itself into its own 
possibilities. Mulhall’s description of understanding as the active component of 
being-in is an apt one (Mulhall 1996, 81): attunement gives us the knowledge that we 
are thrown into the world, and understanding allows us to act on it by allowing us to 
choose the possibilities that are given to us as being-in-the-world. Attunement and 
understanding are the existential structures that underlie the unique characteristics of 
Dasein’s being: its concern with its being, and its having its own possibilities. 
Attunement reveals the being with which Dasein is concerned as being-in-the-world, 
and understanding discloses Dasein’s own possibilities as affected by its being-in- 
the-world.
Attunement and understanding are existential-ontological structures that 
make up Dasein’s being-there. Heidegger's phenomenological method requires that 
these primordial structures be used as a guideline for bringing “the everydayness of 
Dasein into view in a way that is ontologically more primordial.” (SZ 166) By the 
end of Chapter V, Heidegger has laid out the structure of being-in-the-world, of
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which attunement and understanding are the existential fundamentals, and the 
various aspects of entanglement the existential structure of everydayness. However, 
“the phenomenal manifoldness of the constitution of the structural whole and its 
everyday kind of being can now easily distort the unified phenomenological view of 
the whole as such.” (SZ-180) Heidegger has laid out a great number o f different 
aspects of Dasein’s being, but as part of the task of fundamental ontology, he must 
bring these aspects together in order to give an account of the unified totality of 
Dasein’s being.
3.1.2 Angst as a Distinctive Attunement
As with so much of the specialized terminology that Heidegger employs, 
Angst also presents problems for the translator. Kierkegaard uses the term Angst, a 
word that exists both in Danish and German, which Heidegger adopts. Possibilities 
that have been used include anguish, dread and anxiety. Of these, anxiety or dread 
are the best options since they carry with them the idea of directedness towards not- 
yet actualized possibilities. However, given that angst has been appropriated into the 
English language and is universally understood, it seems appropriate to leave the 
word untranslated, as Stambaugh does.
Heidegger takes Angst, or anxiety, as the “phenomenal basis for explicitly 
grasping the primordial totality of being of Dasein.” (SZ 182) At this point, he has 
the idea that this totality of Dasein's being is care or concern, the fact that Dasein is 
always concerned with something, whether that be the being of itself, of others, or 
the surrounding world. It is necessary, however, that he provide a phenomenal basis 
for this claim; there must be sufficient evidence in Dasein's everyday being that 
demonstrates care as its ontological totality. Angst is a specific attunement of Dasein
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that Heidegger believes has the ability to disclose Dasein’s being to itself in a way 
that other moods cannot, because the various characteristics of Angst demonstrate a 
“totality of the structural whole.” (SZ 190) What Heidegger means by this will 
become clearer if  we examine the phenomenon of Angst in more detail.
•Heidegger’s account of Angst borrows heavily from Kierkegaard’s The 
Concept o f  Dread. The similarities and differences have been generally outlined in 
the first chapter of this thesis. This section will examine Heidegger's ideas about 
Angst in more detail. Angst, as an attunement, is a mood in which Dasein can find 
itself. Heidegger contrasts Angst and fear to bring out the distinctive characteristics 
of Angst. Fear is always a fear of specific objectively present beings in the world, 
and as an attunement it does disclose Dasein's being, since “only a being which is 
concerned in its being about that being can be afraid.” (SZ 141) Angst, on the other 
hand, is an indefinite anxiety. There is no particular being that can be pointed out as 
causing the mood. Heidegger believes that this indefiniteness demonstrates that 
Angst is about being-in-the-world as such. Because “nothing of that which is at hand 
and objectively present within the world, functions as what Angst is anxious about,” 
(SZ 186) the beings at hand in the world become irrelevant precisely because none of 
them can be identified as the cause of Angst. Attunement determines the manner in 
which Dasein directs itself toward the world, and in the case of fear, Dasein becomes 
concerned with the object considered to be the cause of this fear. Because Angst has 
an indefinite cause, Dasein ceases to concern itself with the world at hand because 
none of the objects in the world can be pinpointed as the cause of Angst. 
Furthermore, because the object of Angst is indefinite, there can be no particular 
direction from which the threat is seen to approach, because it is already so near to us,
2 Also translated as The Concept o f  Anxiety.
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yet nowhere at the same time. That is to say, that which Angst is about is already so 
close by that we cannot point to where it is—it seems to be part of us already.
Angst is about being-in-the-world as such precisely because it is a 
nothingness and nowhereness: “The recalcitrance of the innerworldly nothing and 
nowhere means phenomenally that what Angst is about is the world as such” (SZ 
187) The things that make up the world become irrelevant and unimportant because 
they cannot be designated as the cause of Angst, and so have no relevance to the 
problem at hand; the only thing that obtrudes into this anxiety is the worldliness of 
the world. With a lack of concern for objects at hand, “Angst.. .fetches Dasein back 
out of its entangled absorption in the ‘world.’” (SZ 189) Angst produces a feeling of 
‘uncanniness,’ as Heidegger calls it, equivalent in German to ‘not-being-at-home.’ 
The feeling of ‘not-being-at-home’ that accompanies the lack of concern about the 
world signifies that Dasein considers its proper place to be in-the-world, interacting 
with and concerned about beings within the world. This sense of unfamiliarity, when 
coupled with the lack of concern for the world, implies that Angst is about being-in- 
the-world, and as an attunement, it discloses to Dasein that its being is always being- 
in-the-world. As such, “tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the 
uncanniness of Dasein, not the other way around. Not-being-at-home must be 
conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon.” (SZ 
189) When Dasein flees from the truth about its being back into entanglement, it 
thinks it is returning home, to where it ought to be, but this is a misapprehension on
f
i -  -
the part of Dasein—its ‘real’ home is authentic existence.
If Angst removes all beings in the world from Dasein’s consideration, it also 
“takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms 
of the ‘world’ and the public way of being interpreted.” (SZ 187) Dasein cannot
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appropriate meaning from the surrounding world and the They anymore, and in this 
sense it becomes individuated. Recalling that attunement is always accompanied by 
understanding, ’’Angst individuates Dasein to its ownmost being-in-the-world which, 
as understanding, projects itself essentially upon possibilities.” (SZ 187-8) The 
individuation of Dasein, along with the understanding that Dasein is its own 
possibilities, shows Dasein that its “ownmost potentiality of being, that is, being free  
for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself.” (SZ 188) Angst discloses to Dasein 
that it must choose its own possibilities—this is part of its being. This process of 
individualization makes Angst an attunement distinctive from all others, since it is 
the only one that discloses Dasein’s potentiality of being. Furthermore, it “fetches 
Dasein back from its falling prey and reveals to it authenticity and inauthenticity as 
possibilities of its being.” (SZ 191) The individuation of Angst shows Dasein two 
possible modes of being: the everyday inauthentic mode, where possibilities are 
taken over by the They, and the authentic mode, in which Dasein appropriates its 
possibilities for itself. At this point, however, Dasein is in a sort of limbo, or 
position of choice, in which it has realized that there are two possible modes of being, 
but has not yet chosen authenticity. The process of becoming authentic will be 
discussed later.
One issue we must address is why being-in-the-world causes Angst at all. If 
Dasein is perfectly at home when absorbed in the world, why does this attunement 
ever arise? This will, perhaps, become clearer after we have examined conscience in 
more detail, but we must first look at care in order to bring together the concepts that 
Angst discloses to us.
3 Heidegger makes conflicting claims about the number o f modes o f being. At times he says there are 
two modes o f  being, authentic and inauthentic, and at other times he argues there are three, and 
includes the indifferent or undifferentiated mode. I will take this problem up in Chapter 4.
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3.1.3 Care and the Totality of Dasein
Heidegger’s purpose in the analysis of Angst was to find a way of disclosing 
“the whole of Dasein in a way that is phenomenally equiprimordial.” (SZ 191) With 
Angst, he believes this has been achieved for a number of reasons: “As attunement, 
being anxious is a way of being-in-the-world; that about which we have Angst is 
thrown being-in-the-world; that for which we have Angst is our potentiality-for- 
being-in-the-world. The complete phenomenon of Angst thus shows Dasein as 
factical, existing being-in-the-world.” (SZ 191) Dasein’s being as in-the-world has 
been demonstrated from a phenomenal basis, Angst, which shows Dasein as factical 
being-in-the-world, and its position thus is characterized by the existential structures 
of “existentiality, facticity, and falling prey.” (SZ 191) That is, Dasein is 
characterized as always existing in the world, absorbed and preoccupied with it, and 
always looking ahead of itself towards its possibilities. (Mulhall 1996, 111) 
However, as we noted before, Heidegger needs to bring these existential elements 
together in order to describe Dasein as a unified totality. The synthesis of the 
ontological factors comes together in the concept of care (Sorge).
The existential idea of care is different from our usage of the word in 
everyday language. Whereas we tend to use it to mean looking after someone or 
something, Heidegger intends the idea of ‘concern about.’ In saying that the being of 
Dasein is care, he means that the being of Dasein is such that it is concerned with its 
surroundings, objects and other individuals, in such a way that it must always attend 
to them or deal with them. Care implies that Dasein is affected and influenced by its 
attitude towards other beings. The idea of care is drawn from the notion that Dasein 
is “always already ahead of itself in its being,” (SZ 192) by which Heidegger means 
that Dasein is always focused upon the existing possibilities that it can choose.
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Dasein is always affected by and oriented towards its future possibilities. 
Furthermore, because Dasein is always in-the-world, it is concerned about the 
physical objects and individuals that populate this world.
Care, as the “formal existential totality of the ontological structural whole of 
Dasein,” (SZ 192) applies to both authentic and inauthentic Dasein alike. The 
difference between the two is the way it directs itself towards its possibilities. 
Inauthentic Dasein taxes iImpossibilities from the They, and must choose from options 
that are considered to be correct and familiar. The care of everyday Dasein is such 
that it pays attention only to, as Heidegger says, what is ‘real,’ while ignoring the 
existence o^its own possibilities, unmediated by the They. Dasein takes care of the 
world in such a way that it chooses its possibilities from ‘what one ought to do’ in a 
specific situation without examining the real possibilities for which it is free, but 
which may not be prescribed by the They. (SZ 195) It is important to remember that 
being toward one’s possibilities is an ontological existential structure, and so is 
present even in inauthentic Dasein, although here it is the case that it is modified and 
takes the form of ‘mere wishing.’ (SZ 195) Inauthentic Dasein “projects its being 
toward possibilities which not only remain ungrasped in taking care of things, but 
whose fulfillment is not even thought about and expected.” (SZ 195) Wishing is the 
inauthentic modification of the existential of projecting itself onto one’s possibilities; 
it differs insofar as authentic projection requires projecting itself onto its possibilities 
freely.
Although care is a more primordial ontological structure than those discussed 
previously, it is still comprised of three disparate elements, ‘being-ahead-of-oneself- 
already-in-the-world’ and ‘being-together-with,’ namely the projecting possibilities 
ahead of one’s self into the world, and being together with beings in the world, as
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well as its fallenness, that shows it to be absorbed in the They. Heidegger believes 
that this is a clue that there remain more primordial levels. The hermeneutic method 
requires that this new information be incorporated into the investigation, which 
Heidegger does in Division II of Being and Time.
3.2 Death
At the end of Division I, Heidegger returns to the issue of the totality of 
Dasein. Care is itself composed of various structural elements, and in this lack of 
unity cannot lay claim to the most primordial level of Dasein’s being. Care, as 
concern about possibilities (‘being-ahead-of-itself ) shows that there is something 
always ‘not-yet’ in Dasein’s being, but a structural totality of Dasein must somehow 
account for this “constant unfinished quality.” (SZ 236) Dasein is only a whole 
when its possibilities end with death, but at this point it ceases to exist and cannot 
understand itself. Heidegger must incorporate death into the existential analysis of 
Dasein.
Another concern at hand is that the account of Dasein’s being has not 
integrated both authentic and inauthentic existence. The analysis in the first division 
focused on inauthentic average everydayness, without explicitly dealing with 
authenticity. The structures that Heidegger has delineated thus far were reached 
without bringing authenticity into the analysis, and he recognizes that the 
“ontological characterization of the constitution of existence was flawed by an 
essential lack. Existence means potentiality-of-being, but also authentic potentiality- 
of-being. As long as the existential structure of authentic potentiality-of-being is not 
incorporated in the idea of existence, the fore-sight guiding an existential 
interpretation lacks primordiality.” (SZ 233) In essence, the preceding analysis
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provided only half of the story. Although Heidegger believed it necessary to begin 
the analysis with everydayness, a unified account of Dasein’s being must incorporate 
both of its modes of being. This is the task that Heidegger now sets out for himself. 
Temporality plays a major role in this section, and he intends to demonstrate that it is 
the “primordial ontological ground o f the existentiality of Dasein.” (SZ 234) 
Integrating being-in-the-world with temporality leads Heidegger to death.
3.2.1 The Death Of Dasein
What does it mean for Dasein to die? Certainly it seems that the death of a 
human being is different from the death of an animal or the destruction o f a physical 
object. The concept of death must first be clarified before Heidegger can use it as the 
basis for any sort of analysis. He undertakes this clarification in Section 48, in which 
he contrasts the death of Dasein with other forms of ending or dying.
The first idea he considers is ‘outstanding,’ meaning “what ‘belongs’ to a 
being, but is still lacking.” (SZ 242) He gives the example of the remainder of a debt 
as something outstanding, and when it is paid off, the entire sum is together: “to be 
outstanding means that what belongs together is not yet together.” (SZ 242) This 
concept, however, belongs to things at hand, and cannot apply to Dasein because 
“the together of the being that Dasein is ‘in running its course’ until it has completed 
‘its course’ is not constituted by a ‘progressive’ piecing-on of beings.” (SZ 243) The 
totality of Dasein cannot be reached by putting bits of it together until wholeness is 
achieved. Heidegger says that “Dasein always already exists in such a way that its 
not-yet belongs to it.” (SZ 243) This sounds paradoxical if  we take it in terms of our 
ordinary understanding of time. How can something be that which it is not ye ti Isn’t 
its ‘not-yet’ by definition what Dasein is not at the present time? This becomes
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clearer once we understand Dasein as being-towards-death. Dasein’s being is always 
a becoming, and as such, the ‘not-yet’ is part of Dasein’s being insofar as Dasein 
existence involves projecting itself forwards onto its possibilities. The idea of, for 
instance, an outstanding debt has no such concept of not-yet in its being. There are 
instances of other objectively present objects that demonstrate a kind of not-yet in 
their being. Heidegger gives the example of the moon in its last quarter. Its not-yet 
lessens as it turns and more of it becomes visible to us. This is not, however, 
something inherent in the being of the moon, but rather a characteristic of our 
perception of the moon. We cannot grasp the whole of the moon when it is not full 
only because of our inability to perceive the entire thing: “the moon is, after all, 
always already objectively present as a whole.” (SZ 243) This is clearly not the case 
with Dasein, since the not-yet of Dasein is never real or accessible in the sense that 
the moon potentially is.
Heidegger then offers the ripening of a fruit as an example of an object who’s 
not-yet is perhaps more analogous to Dasein. The ripeness or unripeness is a way of 
the being of the fruit itself, not something that can exist separately from it, and in this 
manner it can be considered similar to the not-yet of Dasein in that it “is always 
already its not-yet as long as it is.” (SZ 244) However, the difference consists in the 
existential difference between Dasein’s death and the fruit’s ripeness. Heidegger 
claims that ripeness constitutes a ‘fulfillment’ of the fruit because it has “exhausted 
its specific possibilities.” (SZ 244) The same cannot be claimed for Dasein, because 
even with death, Dasein need not have necessarily fulfilled all of its specific 
possibilities. How can we interpret the ‘specific possibilities’ of Dasein? There are 
two options: these could refer to all of the alternative possibilities that Dasein had to 
reject in order to choose the ones it did, or to the further possibilities it might have
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had if death had not ended its existence. Perhaps the best way to understand this is 
as follows. A fruit has only two ways to be: either it is unripe or ripe. With ripeness, 
the fruit has both completed all of its possibilities and reached its highest possibility. 
Heidegger does not mean that Dasein reaches its highest potential with death, since 
“even ‘unfulfilled’ Dasein ends.” (SZ 244) He seems to mean that death prevents 
Dasein from fulfilling any further possibilities, but in this case the fruit analogy does 
not hold, because the fruit has no further possibilities.
Neither is the death of Dasein a ‘stopping’ or ‘finishing.’ Stopping can mean 
different things in different situations: a road stopping differs from a rainfall stopping. 
When the rain stops, it disappears, but when the road stops, it becomes clearly 
defined as a specific entity. Finishing similarly can refer to finishing a painting or 
finishing a race. These concepts can apply only to objectively present objects and 
cannot give a real conception of Dasein’s death. Fulfilment, stopping, finishing and 
disappearing are not adequate concepts to describe death because they fail to 
properly capture the not-yet of Dasein’s possibilities. Heidegger describes death as a 
way of being of Dasein in order to capture this essence. As soon as Dasein comes 
into existence it is always moving towards its death: “just as Dasein constantly 
already is its not-yet as long as it is, it also always already is its end.” (SZ 245)
Heidegger distinguishes between perishing, death and demise. Perishing is 
the biological event of “the ending of what is alive,” (SZ 247) the point at which the 
processes of life cease. The death of animals and plants can obviously be called 
perishing, and it seems so can Dasein, for its death necessarily involves this 
physiological event where cells die and organs shut down. For Heidegger, although 
Dasein dies biologically in the same way plants and animals do, “it does not simply 
perish.” (SZ 246) Demise is the phenomenon applicable to Dasein, an “intermediate
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phenomenon” (SZ 246) between perishing and death. Because Dasein is concerned 
with its being, it has knowledge of its own death as the end of its being in a way that 
animals do not, and thus its death must be differentiated at an ontological level from 
the perishing of animals. Dying is, for Heidegger, “the way o f being in which Dasein 
is toward its death,” (SZ 247) or what he calls being-towards-death; it is not the 
usual concept of an entity nearing its end. Clearly, only Dasein can be ‘dying.’ 
What, then, is ‘death’ proper? Heidegger seems to use death in two ways: in the 
usual sense of death as the end of life, and in an existential way. Some say that we 
can look at death existentially as Dasein’s understanding of its demise (Blattner 1994, 
54-55) but this is not correct, since Heidegger designates dying as the understanding 
of demise. Demise, as an ontic phenomenon, requires an underlying ontological 
structure. This ontological structure is what Heidegger calls ‘death.’ Before we deal 
with Dasein’s death in more detail, we must look at what death means for Dasein’s 
possibilities.
3.2.2 Totality and Death
Dasein is always ahead of itself. As long as Dasein exists, there is a certain 
unfinished quality about it because it will always have more possibilities to project 
itself upon. This presents a problem for understanding the totality o f Dasein. 
However, when Dasein reaches the point at which there are no longer any 
possibilities for it, it ceases to be. The end of Dasein is the point at which 
possibilities end, but after this occurs Dasein is no longer a being and it cannot be 
understood as a whole. It is a structural characteristic of being that there is an 
“impossibility of experiencing Dasein ontically as an existing whole and thus of 
defining it ontologically in its wholeness.” (SZ 236) Being-ahead-of-itself is the
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reason that we cannot experience the being of Dasein as a whole, and as an 
existential structure of care, it must be addressed. Death plays a major role in the 
totality of Dasein.
Dasein can only be understood as a whole when it has been ‘completed,’ 
when it has no more possibilities, but “as long as Dasein is a being, it has never 
attained its ‘wholeness.’ But if  it does, this gain becomes the absolute loss of being- 
in-the-world.” (SZ 236) Dasein becomes whole when it dies, but at the moment of 
death it ceases to be Dasein and “is never again to be experienced as a being.” (SZ 
236) Death is the moment at which Dasein is no longer Dasein and becomes an 
objectively present being in the world. Clearly, as Dasein ceases to be it can no 
longer experience anything, and can never experience the totality of its being because 
of the nature of death. Heidegger wonders if  perhaps the death of others can help us 
to understand the totality of being, but there are a number of factors that prevent this 
from being the case.
In experiencing the death of another, we do not experience the death ‘from 
the inside’ but from our own detached personal perspective. We cannot know what it 
is like for the person to die. Our experience of the death of the other does not 
disclose anything distinctive. When someone else dies, those that remain experience 
his body as a objectively present thing, but also as “something unliving which has 
lost its life.” (SZ 238) The body is not merely an objectively present object at hand 
like a chair or a table, but carries with it the reminder that it was once a Dasein. In 
this way, death is experienced as a loss, but only as the loss of the other from the 
world, not the deceased’s loss of his own life: “Death does reveal itself as a loss, but 
as a loss experienced by those remaining behind. However, in suffering the loss, the 
loss of being as such which the dying person ‘suffers’ does not become accessible.”
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(SZ 238-9) The only thing that the death of the other reveals to us are the ways of 
being that are exhibited by the individuals left behind. This does not provide any 
sort of ontological or existential insight into the totality of Dasein.
From this idea that Dasein can never experience the death o f the other 
Heidegger draws the idea that there is no representability in death. In other situations, 
one individual can substitute for another quite easily: “the broad multiplicity of ways 
of being-in-the-world in which one person can be represented by another extends not 
only to the used-up modes of public being with one another, but concerns as well the 
possibilities of taking care of things limited to definite circles, tailored to professions, 
social classes, and stages o f life.” (SZ 239) The nature of objectively present objects 
in the world is such that any Dasein using it can be substituted for another. For 
instance, I can use a hammer to pound a nail, but I can be just as easily replaced by 
an another individual performing the task. This also applies to the performance of 
specific roles: a professor giving a lecture can be replaced by another individual who 
lectures in his place. This characteristic of representability applies to everything we 
do in everyday life, except, it seems, death. However, Philipse makes a good point 
in his claim that functions that involve the body, such as eating or breathing, are 
similarly unsubstitutable. (Philipse 1998, 360) This may be true, but an activity like 
eating does not have the same claim to totality that death does. In another sense, 
even having someone else lecture in my place would be unsubstitutable, since they 
cannot do my doing of the task. They could give my lecture fo r  me, but only I can 
give my lecture in the sense that my doing a task requires me to do it—in this sense, 
everything is unrepresentable. Perhaps it is wrong of Heidegger to claim that death 
is the only thing that is unrepresentable, but the point is that only death satisfies all of 
the particular criteria to make it a distinctive event. One cannot die someone else’s
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death for them. It is possible to die for somebody else, i.e sacrificing oneself for 
another, but this is not what Heidegger means. Even if  I die for the sake o f someone 
else, I still die my own death that no one can experience or take away from me. 
Although I may have removed the immediate possibility of death from the other, he 
will still have to eventually die his own death. Some commentators, notably 
Edwards, say this is trite: if  I die, of course I die my own death and not someone 
else’s, this is the nature of death or anything else that is a bodily process. Edwards 
accuses Heidegger of making uninteresting and uninsightful claims about death, but 
he fails to examine the ontological context within which Heidegger is making these 
claims. Without relating death to fundamental ontology, Heidegger’s views on death 
can seem nonsensical and obvious. I will take up Edwards’ criticisms in more depth 
in Chapter 4.
How do individuation and unsubstitutability relate to totality? The 
unsubstitutability of death individuates Dasein, since no one else can die my death 
for me. But as we saw, this is also applicable in the case of bodily activities. 
However, as we will see in the following section, death has other characteristics such 
as certainty and indefiniteness that make it a distinctive phenomenon. While eating 
or drinking may individuate me in the same way, they do not possess the other 
characteristics of death that allow us to understand Dasein as a totality. We will now 
examine being-towards-death in more detail, and what it means to be directed 
towards one’s death in both an authentic and an inauthentic manner.
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3.2.3 Being-Towards-Death: Inauthentic and Authentic
Speaking about death can take many forms. We can investigate the 
biological, psychological, historical and cultural aspects of death, but they are all 
dependent on an ontological foundation. As with the other phenomena Heidegger 
has examined, he must determine the existential structure of death, and he begins, in 
accordance with his method, “by giving...an ontological characterization of the kind 
of being in which the ‘end’ enters into the average everydayness of Dasein.” (SZ 
248) If death or being-towards-death is a mode of being of Dasein, it must be 
definable in terms of the characteristics of the “fundamental constitution of Dasein” 
(SZ 249); these are the ideas of being-ahead-of-itself, being-with, existence, facticity, 
and falling prey.
Previously, Heidegger spoke about death as an unsubstitutable and 
individualizing possibility. There are other characteristics of death that are equally 
important and serve to make it a distinctive experience. Death is always certain for 
Dasein; it is without doubt that all individuals on this planet will die at some point, 
^  and it is impossible t0 4 ry jo  avert it. He initially defines death as “the ownmost 
nonrelational possibility not to be bypassed.” (SZ 251) When Dasein comes into 
being, it is immediately thrown into this possibility, although it does not yet realize 
this until Angst discloses “the fact that Dasein exists as thrown bemg-toward-\\s- 
end.” (SZ 251) The normal mode of dealing with being-towards-death involves 
fleeing from it, or evading it by refusing to see it as ah ownmost, nonrelational, 
unsurpassable possibility. In keeping with the method used thus far, the average 
everyday understanding of being-towards-death must be examined in order to 
determine its existential-ontological structure.
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In everyday life, we speak of death in a way that is dictated by our absorption 
in the They. The attitude of the They towards death is one of detachment or 
indeterminacy. We are familiar with death through reading stories of deaths in a 
newspaper or watching them in movies, but this prompts an attitude of detachment, 
and a vague feeling that although death is a certainty, it is not going to happen right 
now, to me; as Heidegger says, “ ‘Death’ is encountered as a familiar event occurring 
within the world...death is understood as an indeterminate something which first has 
to show up from somewhere, but which right now is not yet objectively present for 
oneself, and is thus no threat.” (SZ 253) Everyday Dasein tends to view death as 
something that happens to others, not grasped in its certainty or individuality, and 
“dying, which is essentially and irreplaceably mine, is distorted into a publicly 
occurring event which the they encounters.” (SZ 253) One of the main ways of 
inauthentically dealing with death is the refusal to accept it as certain. It is obviously 
the case that every Dasein knows that death is inevitable, we all realize this as an 
indubitable fact, but we refuse to accept it. As Heidegger describes it, “One knows 
about the certainty of death, and yet ‘/s’ not really certain about it.” (SZ 258)
What does it mean to refuse to accept death as certain? Heidegger says “to be 
certain of a being means to hold it for true as something true,” (SZ 256) but there are 
two kinds of certainty: a primordial certainty where being-certain is a kind of being 
of Dasein, and a derivative certainty in which anything-of which we are certain is
-i
itself certain. Everyday Dasein’s certainty of death covers over death as really is, 
and “thus the certainty which belongs to such a covering over of being-towards-death 
must be an inappropriate way of holding-for-true.” (SZ 257) While everyday Dasein 
thinks it is certain of death, it is certain of something that is not true, namely the 
inauthentic concept of death. In this sense, we might say that inauthentic Dasein is
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certain about a misconceived notion of death, not about authentic being-towards- 
death. If authentic being-towards-death involves the knowledge that one’s 
possibilities are ended with death, even everyday certainty about death should suffice 
to give Dasein some sort of clue to its being. However, everyday certainty about 
death is only an empirical certainty, gleaned from one’s awareness of the death of 
others. As an empirical certainty about the occurrence of death, it tells Dasein 
nothing about how death really is. (King 2001, 156) Furthermore, empirical 
knowledge of death must always be the death of the other, not myself; this 
perpetuates in Dasein a sense of detachment from death and a failure to accept it as 
its ownmost possibility. (Demske 1970, 28)
In a similar way, everyday Dasein acts towards death as if  it will come ‘later.’ 
I do not act with the realization that it is a very real fact that I could die tomorrow; 
instead, I think of my death as something happening in the future, at some indefinite 
time. This, says Heidegger, is an attitude that conceals the idea that death is possible 
at any given moment. Another way o f dealing with death perpetuated by the They is 
the proper behaviour toward death in general: “Even ‘thinking about death’ is 
regarded publicly as cowardly fear, a sign of insecurity on the part of Dasein and a 
dark flight from the world.” (SZ 254) For the They, death is not an issue worth 
considering, especially in a fearful way, and the proper attitude towards death is one 
of indifference. These aspects of the They’s conception of being-towards-death 
demonstrate the same structure of ‘falling prey’ that is prominent throughout average 
everydayness. Indifference and detachment towards death signify Dasein’s evasion 
of the true nature of death, and the idea of death put forth by the They can be seen as 
concealing the existential characteristics of death: its certainty, mineness, 
nonsubstitutability, and unbypassability.
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The evasion of these characteristics of death constitute the inauthentic, 
everyday way of being-towards-death. Absorbed in the They, Dasein has its attitude 
towards death prescribed for it in such a way that it covers up the individuating, 
certain, indefinite possibilities of death. Why does Dasein evade the true nature of 
its death in such a manner? The authentic conception of death shows Dasein as it 
really is, thrown into the They-world, with no possibilities as individual as death. 
Having seen what inauthentic being-towards-death means, we can surmise that an 
authentic attitude towards death must refrain from evasion and allow death to be 
disclosed in a manner that expresses its existential characteristics. Authentic being- 
towards-death must embrace death as Dasein's ownmost, nonrelational, certain, not 
to be bypassed possibility in a way that is unencumbered by the influence of the 
They and free of any evasion or concealment. It is all very well to describe 
authenticity in this manner, but as an ontic possibility of Dasein, there must be some 
concrete way of putting it into practice, a specific way of acting or thinking that 
factical Dasein can carry out authentically. Thinking of death as a possibility seems 
to suggest death as something not yet actualized, so perhaps the authentic response to 
being-toward-death involves making the possibility of death an actuality. Not so, 
says Heidegger: actualizing one’s death, for instance, committing suicide, is an 
inauthentic response to being-towards-death, for in this manner “Dasein would 
precisely deprive itself of the very ground for an existing being-towards-death.” (SZ 
260) As Mulhall says, “Suicide is not even a mode of being-towards-death, let alone 
an authentic one.” (Mulhall 1996, 118) Since killing one’s self means to remove any 
way of being at all, it cannot be an authentic response to being-towards-death. 
Heidegger goes on to say that “ ‘thinking about death,’ thinking about this possibility, 
how and when it might be actualized” (SZ 260) is not an authentic attitude either.
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Expecting death is an attitude that ‘weakens’ the possibility of death, in that it 
amounts to “essentially a waiting fo r  that actualization.” (SZ 262) Suicide, brooding, 
and expectation are all ways of being that treat death as actuality rather than 
possibility, and for this reason are inauthentic.
But what does it mean to say death is a possibility? On the face of it, death 
seems more than possible, it is inevitable—there is no question that this event will 
come to pass. Heidegger, however, has a somewhat different conception of 
possibility from the everyday idea of possibility as something that could be 
actualized but need not necessarily be. In Section 31, he makes some comments on 
what it means to be a possibility. The usual concept of possibility refers to 
objectively present objects, wherein “possibility means what is not yet real and not 
always necessary.” (SZ 143) As an existential concept applied to Dasein, however, it 
takes on a different meaning. Dasein is always ‘being-possible’ in that it “is always 
what it can be and how it is its possibility.” (SZ 143) For example, being a teacher 
or reading a book are ways of being of Dasein. Dasein is a thing that teaches or a 
thing that reads a book. Its possibilities are all different ways of being. In this same 
way, being-towards-death death can be called a possibility, since it is a way of being 
of Dasein. Some commentators accuse Heidegger of using ‘possibility’ in a sense 
that ignores its traditional meaning, and he probably ought to have chosen a different 
term. However, if  we understand possibility in an existential sense to mean a way of 
being, there is not too much of a problem in seeing that being-towards-death is a 
possibility of Dasein.
Thus, authentic being-towards-death involves understanding death as a way 
of being of Dasein, and “relatefs] itself to that death so that it reveals itself, in this 
being and for it, as possibility.” (SZ 262) Heidegger calls this anticipation, but again
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he does not use the term in the normal sense of awaiting the actualization of a 
possibility, but as an approach towards the being-towards-death that increases one’s 
understanding of it as “the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general.” 
(SZ 262) It is contrasted with expectation, a response that involves awaiting the 
actualization of the possibility, since “to expect something possible is always to 
understand and ‘have’ it with regard to whether and when and how it will really be 
objectively present.” (SZ 262) Expectation, in contrast to anticipation, fails to 
address death in its ownmost, nonrelational, unsurpassable, certain aspects.
In anticipation, as an authentic attitude towards death, Dasein realizes that 
death is its ownmost possibility, in which it is concerned with its own being, and “in 
the eminent possibility of itself it is tom away from the they.” (SZ 263) It 
understands itself as concerned with its own being, and “reveals its factical lostness 
in the everydayness of the they-self,” (SZ 264) and the fact that all of its everyday 
possibilities are determined by the They. Dasein also comes to understand death as 
its nonrelational possibility, as the one possibility that belongs solely to itself and in 
this way individuates Dasein. As we have seen, Angst about death causes Dasein to 
cease taking care of others and things in the world, but this, coupled with the 
knowledge that Dasein’s possibilities are determined by the They, brings with it the 
understanding that authenticity will require Dasein to take care of the world in a way 
that projects itself “primarily upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being, rather than 
upon the possibility of the they-self.” (SZ 263-264) Authenticity means Dasein 
projects itself upon its possibilities with the knowledge that its being is being- 
toward-death. Understanding death as not to be bypassed means knowing that death 
cannot be avoided, and gives Dasein a certain kind of freedom from the They, in that 
it understands that it need not be in the way that the They determines it should.
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Authentic Dasein comes to understand that all of its possibilities are transitory, and
that death will eventually negate them all. In this way, it realizes that all of its
possibilities are contingent, that nothing it does or chooses is necessary. Somehow
realizing death is not to be bypassed means that it has “disclosed all the possibilities
lying before it, [and] this anticipation includes the possibility of taking the whole of
Dasein in advance in an existentiell way, that is, the possibility of existing as a whole
potentiality-of-beingr (SZ 264) Finally, understanding death as certain and
indefinite means that “Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising from its own
there.” (SZ 265) Authenticity involves ‘cultivating’ this unavoidable th reat. Taken
together, these characteristics of the anticipation of authentic being-towards-death
are summarized by Heidegger:
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and 
brings it face to face with the possibility to be itself, primarily 
unsupported by concern taking care of things, but to be itself in 
passionate anxious freedom toward death which is free of the 
illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself. (SZ 266)
This is the ontological description of authentic being-towards-death, but it is 
necessary that there be an ontic-existentiell possibility of enacting this. Here we see 
a sort of reversal of Heidegger’s method, in which he determines the ontological 
basis before looking for evidence of ontic phenomena. Presumably, this is because 
authenticity is infrequent, and we might ask if it is even possible to achieve, if we 
recall the problem of the cause of Angst and in the next section, the problem of 
locating the source of the call of conscience. The next section will take into 
conscience into account as the structure that allows us to become authentic, not just 
towards-death, but as a whole potentiality-for-being.
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3.3 Authentic Potentiality-of-Being
At this point in Being and Time, Heidegger has shown us the ontological 
structure of authentic being-towards-death, but it “means nothing as long as the 
corresponding ontic potentiality-of-being has not been shown in terms of Dasein 
itself” (SZ 266) Dasein must be able to put into practice the ontological idea of 
anticipating one’s death authentically, as well as authentically relating to one’s being. 
The first step in determining this is understanding how authenticity is ‘attested to,’ or 
how authenticity is made known to Dasein as existentielly possible. Here Heidegger 
strays away from his discussion of being-towards-death to focus on the means by 
which Dasein becomes authentic.
3.3.1 Conscience
As we have already seen, Dasein is always absorbed in the world, fallen prey 
to the They and its public ways of being, and as such is inauthentic because its 
possibilities are determined by the They, rather than by self-responsibility. 
Authenticity requires a way of bringing Dasein out of its lostness in the They, and 
“in order to find itself at all, it must be ‘shown’ to itself in its possible authenticity. 
In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-being-its-self, but it 
needs to have this potentiality attested.” (SZ 268) There must be some phenomenon 
that discloses to Dasein the possibility of being authentic, and Heidegger believes 
that conscience plays this role. In his method of examining conscience as the 
existential phenomenon that discloses the possibility of authenticity to Dasein, he 
begins by putting forth an ontological theory before examining the ‘vulgar’ or 
everyday sense of conscience. This is a reversal of the earlier method in which he 
used everyday phenomena as the basis from which further existential and ontological
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structures are derived. He performed this same reversal when explicating being- 
towards-death
Conscience, as Heidegger conceives of it, is a means of disclosure. Even in 
the everyday sense of the word, something is disclosed to us, although what is 
disclosed is very different ■ from what is disclosed by the existential structure of 
conscience. The existential idea of conscience is more primordial than the everyday, 
and is what underlies and makes possible our having experiences of conscience in the 
normal understanding of the word. However, both senses of conscience tell us 
something, they disclose something to us; Heidegger calls the disclosing act of 
existential conscience the ‘call of conscience.’ As a call, conscience must be 
directed at someone, which in this case is Dasein, lost in the They. The call ‘passes 
over’ the part of Dasein that takes care of things and of others in the world, and 
“because only the se lf of the they-self is summoned and made to hear, the they 
collapses.” (SZ 273) As conscience ignores the They, making it seem insignificant, 
the authentic selfhood of Dasein is summoned from within the They-self. In this way, 
conscience discloses Dasein’s real self as being-in-the-world to itself, and “is the 
summons of the self to its potentiality-of-being-a-self, and thus calls Dasein forth to 
its possibilities.” (SZ 274)
The nature of the call itself is unusual, because Heidegger says that “the call 
does not say anything, does not give any information about the events of the world, 
has nothing to tell.” (SZ 273) There is no content in the call, and “conscience speaks 
solely and constantly in the mode of silence,” (SZ 273) but how can such an empty 
call disclose anything to us at all? The silence of the call is a necessary aspect in 
allowing Dasein to detach itself from the They. Since there is no content in the call, 
it cannot be made a subject of ‘idle talk,’ one of the modes of being of the They that
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is inauthentic: “ ‘It’ calls and yet gives the heedfiilly curious ears nothing to hear that 
could be passed along and publicly spoken about.” (SZZ 277) The emptiness of the 
call prevents the They-self from appropriating it into the They, and reducing its 
authenticity by making it public: “it does not call him into the public idle chatter of 
the they, but calls him back from that to the reticence o f  his existent potentiality-of- 
being.” (SZ 277) Furthermore, who is that makes the call? There is an indefinable 
quality to whatever it is that makes the call, but Heidegger contends that it is Dasein 
itself that calls. He rejects explanations of the caller as a third party or a sort of 
psychological process. It is clearly problematic and circular, however, that Dasein 
both makes and receives the call. For the analysis to be coherent, there must be a 
duality of Dasein, in which one part understands and is presumably authentic, while 
the other part remains immersed in the They. If this is the case, we must ask how it 
is possible for the authentic part of Dasein to reach this state. If the call of 
conscience is what allows Dasein to become authentic, how did the caller become 
authentic?
Mulhall offers a modification that he says solves the problem of circularity, 
but it involves discarding Heidegger’s explicit claim that there is no third party 
involved in the call of conscience. An authentic individual might perhaps disrupt 
Dasein’s absorption in the They by providing the example of an authentic existence 
that inauthentic Dasein could somehow emulate. (Mulhall 1996, 131-135) 
Heidegger does say that “Resolute Dasein can become the ‘conscience’ of others.” 
(SZ 298) However, even if conscience could be understood as a long line of 
authentic individuals passing on their understanding to willing recipients, there 
remains the problem of accounting for the authenticity of the first authentic Dasein. 
Mulhall claims this problem can be solved if  we realize that absorption in the They is
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not universal and absolute; there will always be some fragment of authenticity in 
“disregarded texts, moribund institutions or marginalized individuals,” because “no 
community of beings to whom an understanding of their own Being necessarily 
belongs could utterly lose a sense of themselves as capable of authenticity.” 
(Mulhall 1996, 181) Yet this seems to displace the problem of authenticity onto 
these texts, institutions or individuals. How did they become authentic? Suppose all 
of human civilization was wiped out in a nuclear holocaust, with the exception of a 
few babies. There are no texts left that might provide insight, and no individuals left 
with the knowledge of authenticity. Against all odds, these babies grow up into adult 
Daseins; as Dasein, they are with-others, in-the-world, with a pre-ontological 
understanding of being. By all rights, they are theoretically capable of becoming 
authentic, but if  Mulhall relies on the necessity o f a third party to impart this 
knowledge, there seems no way that they could become authentic. The introduction 
of a third party as the caller of conscience is not only at odds with Heidegger’s own 
claims, but seems unable to completely eradicate the original problem. The only 
other possibility is that Dasein always already has a dual structure in which both the 
authentic self and the inauthentic self exist, but in which the dominance of the They 
conceals authenticity from the They-self. This leads to the issue of the impetus that 
allows the authentic self to make the call of conscience. Yet there seems to be no 
solut/ion to the problem, other than to accept that some Daseins can spontaneously 
become authentic.
Heidegger says that the call is made by Dasein “in its uncanniness, 
primordially thrown being-in-the-world, as not-at-home, the naked ‘that’ in the 
nothingness of the world.” (SZ 276-277) We saw uncanniness previously as revealed 
by Angst, in which it “confronts being-in-the-world with the nothingness of the
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world about which it is anxious in the Angst about its ownmost potentiality-of-being. 
(SZ 276) Angst reveals the uncanniness to Dasein, and caller of conscience is 
“Dasein, finding itself in the ground o f  its uncanniness.” (SZ 277) That is, Angst 
reveals Dasein’s being to it as being-in-the-world, and this revelation prepares 
Dasein for a more primordial understanding of its being as being-guilty. These 
qualities of the call o f conscience, that “the caller is Dasein, anxious in its 
thrownness...about its potentiality-of-being,” and that “the one summoned is also 
Dasein, called forth to its ownmost potentiality-of-being,” and that “what is called 
forth by the summons is Dasein, out of falling prey to the they,” (SZ 277-278) 
demonstrate that the call of conscience is the call of care. Only because Dasein is 
characterized by the three-fold nature of care—projection, thro wnness, and 
fallenness—can the call of conscience be possible at all.
Heidegger only addresses the everyday idea of conscience after he has 
formulated the existential structure of the concept. This is unusual, given the method 
he has used thus far, but I suspect it is because he has difficulties reconciling his 
existential conscience with the everyday conception o f conscience. In fact, he points 
out that several features of everyday conscience that are at odds with the idea of 
conscience that he has advanced; we usually think of conscience as directed towards 
“a definite deed that has been done or wished for,” as a phenomenon of the mind that 
differentiates between good and evil, and which “pays no attention to the basic forms 
of the phenomenon.” (SZ 290) In realizing this conflict, Heidegger asks “Must the 
ontological interpretation be in harmony with the vulgar interpretation at all? Should 
not the latter be, in principle, ontologically suspect?” (SZ 289) But is he not turning 
the method which he has followed up to now on its head? Previously, he asserted the 
importance of beginning with everyday ideas, as phenomenological basis, from
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which the underlying existential structures could be discerned. Why, with the 
phenomenon of conscience, does he suddenly say that everyday ideas are 
ontologically suspect? It does not seem methodologically appropriate that he should 
suddenly abandon the philosophical importance of everyday ideas when they conflict 
with his ontological formulations.
3.3.2 Guilt
Heidegger has a discussion of guilt in conjunction with the examination of 
conscience, and makes a closer inspection of what it is exactly that conscience 
discloses to Dasein. As outlined before, we know that the call means “calling forth 
the authentic self to its potentiality-of-being, as Dasein, that is, being-in-the-world 
taking care of things and being-with-others.” (SZ 280) The call does not give Dasein 
any specific existentiell information about its particular factical possibilities; rather, 
it gives a general idea of the existential structure underlying the possibilities of each 
Dasein. Given that Heidegger has identified this as the call of conscience, he must 
address the idea of guilt as that which is disclosed in the call.
In everyday language, guilt is a regret about owing something or being 
responsible for something, which one’s conscience calls to one’s attention as a lack, 
“when something which ought to be and can be is missing.” (SZ 283) Heidegger 
emphasizes that this is the ‘vulgar’ conception of guilt, primarily because it is 
involved with taking care of things at hand, and lacking or missing something can 
only refer to the absence of the objectively present. Everyday guilt has existential 
guilt as its primordial basis, and supplies the “existential condition of the possibility 
of the ‘morally’ good and evil, that is, for morality in general and its possible factical 
forms.” (SZ 286) However, he is not concerned with the common notion of guilt
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here, and although he gives a brief summary of what this means, he focuses on the 
ontological structure of guilt. Existential guilt, since it is the primordial structure of 
vulgar guilt, must itself be characterized by the idea of ‘the not,’ (since in order to 
have everyday guilt, the basic form of it as a nullity must be already present in 
existential guilt) and he defines it as “being-the-ground for a being which is 
determined by a not—that is, being-the-ground o f a nullity.” (SZ 283) It is important 
to remember that this ‘not’ does not signify a lack of something in the way an 
objectively present object can be missing.
What does Heidegger mean by ground? Dasein is a ground in that it projects 
itself upon its possibilities. It is the locus from which and as which it projects its 
possibilities, and yet because it is always already thrown into the They, its 
possibilities are never its own: “The self, which as such has to lay the ground of itself, 
can never gain power over that ground, and yet it has to take over being the ground 
in existing.” (SZ 284) Dasein, in being, must always project its possibilities, but 
these possibilities are determined by the specific situation in which it finds itself, and 
since it is always thrown into the They, these possibilities it must choose from are 
never really its own. Thro wnness is a nullity, since Dasein’s possibilities are not its 
own. Heidegger’s use of the term nullity does not, however, mean he is suggesting 
that there is something worthless or lesser about Dasein’s being; it just means that 
Dasein’s being is characterized by ‘nots.’ Choosing a possibility means giving up 
other ones; this abandonment of other possibilities in order to project one’s chosen 
possibilities constitutes a nullity because Dasein “is constantly not other possibilities 
and has relinquished them in its existentiell project.” (SZ 285) Falling prey also 
involves a nullity, since it is a matter of not being authentic. This aspect of the three 
components of the care-structure demonstrates that “care, as the being of Dasein,
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thus means, as thrown project: being the (null) ground of a nullity. And that means 
that Dasein as such is guilty if  our formal existential definition of guilt as being-the- 
ground o f a nullity is valid.” (SZ 285) So we see that care can be described more 
primordially as being-guilty, in the existential sense. If conscience is the call of care, 
then the call can be described as a “summoning to being-guilty,” (SZ 287) that 
involves “a calling forth to the potentiality-of-being that I always already am as 
Dasein.” (SZ 287) Essentially, conscience calls us to understand the nullities that 
make up the being of Dasein. Because Dasein’s being is care, it is always ‘guilty.’ It 
can never escape this existential guilt because it is a fundamental structure of its 
existence, unlike everyday guilt that can be lessened or eliminated by atoning or 
making reparations. Dasein is always already being-guilty. We see that Heidegger 
offers a rather unusual concept of guilt, having only the idea of the ‘not’ in common 
with our everyday idea of guilt. We might try to understand existential guilt as an 
attempt to secularize the Kierkegaardian interpretation of the Christian doctrine of 
original sin, but Dreyfus points out that Kierkegaard believed that “sinfulness is a 
state of the culture into which we are bom; original sin is the fact that we actively 
embrace this state.” (Dreyfus 1991, 314) If we understand this to be the case, 
existential being-guilty is therefore comparable to the state of innocence This 
apparent reversal of the the concept of guilt suggests that Heidegger’s application of 
‘guilt’ to the existential structure bearing its name is perhaps a poor choice. On the 
other hand, we could consider it to be a further indication of the distortion and 
concealment characteristic of the They.
The summoning that Heidegger describes means that Dasein chooses “being 
free for one’s ownmost being-guilty. Understanding the summons means: wanting to 
have a conscience.” (SZ 288) In the existential sense, wanting to have a conscience
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refers to “the readiness to be summoned.” (SZ 288) Once the summons or call has 
been understood, Dasein can direct itself towards its actions with the knowledge that 
has been disclosed: “Dasein lets its ownmost self take action in itself in terms of its 
chosen potentiality-of-being. Only in this way can it be responsible.” (SZ 288) 
Understanding the call of conscience means Dasein understands itself as being-guilty, 
understanding the nullity of its existence and the true nature of itself as thrownness, 
projection and falling prey. Once this is recognized, Dasein can reorient itself to its 
proper potentiality-of-being, and project itself forward into its possibilities with the 
understanding that it is doing this for its own being instead of the being of the They. 
Having heard the call, and understanding it, Dasein is not yet authentic. It is perhaps 
still in an undifferentiated mode of being and being prepared for authenticity, but 
only with resoluteness does Dasein achieve it.
3.3.3 Resoluteness
Resoluteness is the state where Dasein itself has finally become authentic, the 
“reticent projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost being-guilty which is ready for 
Angst.” (SZ 297) Since resoluteness is essentially an understanding that it is guilty, 
it must have the corresponding attunement and discourse that accompany any 
understanding. The attunement present in resoluteness is Angst, as “the 
disclosedness of Dasein in wanting-to-have-a-conscience.” (SZ 297) The discourse 
involved in resoluteness is ‘reticence,’ or the silence of the call of conscience. 
(Mulhall, 129) Resoluteness is the disclosedness where “the most primordial truth of 
Dasein has been reached, because it is authentic.” (SZ 297)
These concepts must be applied at an ontic level if authenticity is to be put 
into practice. Dasein always is, and always will be, thrown into the world. Its being,
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as being-in-the-world, means it must care for others and things in the world,
regardless of it being inauthentic or authentic. Resoluteness does not imply that
Dasein somehow detaches itself from the world. In authenticity,
the ‘world’ at hand does not become different as far as 
‘content,’ the circle of the others is not exchanged for a new one, 
and yet the being towards things at hand which understands and 
takes care of things and the concerned being-with with the 
others is now defined in terms of their ownmost potentiality of 
being a self. (SZ 297-298)
»e pcfiStM fo s
That is, Dasein still exists in the same world, with the same people?but projects itself 
in a way that its^possibilities are no longer determined by the They. Despite its own 
authenticity, Dasein still has to be m a world that is dominated by the They, and 
“understanding this is one of the things resolution discloses, in that resoluteness first 
gives to Dasein its authentic transparency.” (SZ 299) Dasein can never completely 
escape the influence o f the They, but it can project its possibilities in such a way that 
“Dasein is concerned with its ownmost potentiality-of-being that, as thrown, can 
project itself only upon definite, factical possibilities.” (SZ 299) Heidegger calls the 
‘there’ disclosed in this new resolute way the ‘situation.’ It is an authentic parallel of 
the ‘Da’ of Dasein, but understood in authentic resoluteness rather than through the 
They.
At this point, Heidegger must bring together the ideas of being-toward-death 
and being-guilty, which both “invoke different inflections of a single conception of 
negativity at the heart of human existence.” (Mulhall 1996, 138) Being-guilty has 
shown us that Dasein is always thrown into possibilities that it did not choose, but for 
which it must exercise responsibility in authentic resoluteness, but, as Heidegger asks, 
“What is death supposed to have in common with the ‘concrete situation’ of acting?” 
(SZ 302) How does the account of authentic being-towards-death as anticipation
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given previously come together with the account of authentic potentiality-of-being as 
resoluteness? Heidegger brings them together in anticipatory resoluteness, which is 
the totality o f authentic Dasein’s being. For resolute Dasein to understand its 
existential guilt, it must also understand that this guilt is a constant feature of its 
being, up until the moment of its death. The nullity of being-guilty ends only with 
the nullity that comes with death, the point at which Dasein ‘is not’: “Resoluteness 
becomes authentically what it can be as being-toward-the-end-that understands, that 
is, as anticipation of death.” (SZ 305) Resoluteness and anticipation are not two 
separate concepts, but are “two central marks of the conditionedness or finitude of 
human existence—finitude as mortality and finitude as nullity.” (Mulhall 1996, 138) 
Dasein is only authentic when it realizes that it is thrown into possibilities that are 
not its own, amongst which it must choose some and abandon others, and that at any 
moment, Dasein may cease to exist. The proper anticipation of being-towards-death 
requires the knowledge that Dasein is thrown, projecting, and fallen prey, while the 
proper resoluteness of being-guilty requires the knowledge that death is certain, 
unavoidable and individualizing. Mulhall describes anticipation as the “authentic 
existentiell modification of resolutness.” (Mulhall 1996, 138) The anticipation of 
being-towards-death is the proper way of projecting one’s possibilities in such a way 
that Dasein understands that it is guilty and its being is essentially a nothingness. 
Anticipatory resoluteness means essentially that Dasein projects itself onto its 
possibilities knowing that it is being-in-the-world, that its possibilities are determined 
by its being in the world, but takes them up with an attitude
We will recall that Heidegger’s original project consisted of an attempt to 
determine the totality or unity of Dasein’s being, as a step towards outlining a 
fundamental ontology. Anticipation of being-towards-death was only an ontological
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construction, but anticipatory resoluteness gives it an “ontic-existentiell 
concretization.” (King, 206) Anticipatory resoluteness gives existentiell wholeness, 
but for existential totality, Heidegger will have to look at temporality as the 
ontological basis of care; this is itself a large topic and for the purposes of this 
dissertation, I will not go into it. Heidegger has shown how Angst, as an attunement, 
discloses to Dasein its being as being-in-the-world. The anxiety that this disclosure 
presents makes Dasein ready to hear the call of conscience summon to it that its 
being is essentially a nullity. Dasein must face the fact of its existence as thrown into 
the world, and must project its possibilities with the knowledge that its possibilities 
are contingent and finite. Nothingness lies at the basis of Dasein’s being, and 
authentic existence lies in accepting this and projecting one’s self upon one’s 
possibilities with an attitude of anticipatory resoluteness.
82
4. Criticisms of Heidegger
Thus far, this dissertation has attempted a systematic commentary of 
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. We must now turn to a deeper examination of 
some of the more problematic and controversial ideas in his account, and look at the 
criticisms some philosophers have put forth, as well as the possibility of defending 
Heidegger from these critiques. I will focus on three main areas: death, das Man, 
and authenticity.
4.1 Death
We will first look at criticisms of Heidegger’s account of death and being- 
towards death. Two of the main critics of Heidegger’s thought in this area are Paul 
Edwards, in his Heidegger and Death: A Critical Evaluation, and Herman Philipse, 
although he relies heavily on Edwards’ own work. Edwards takes issue with nearly 
everything Heidegger says about death, and his monograph is a scathing 
condemnation of Heidegger’s thought that accuses many of Heidegger’s views on 
death of being trite and uninteresting. One paper claims the rift comes from the fact 
that they are from two opposing schools of thought, and Edwards’ disagreement with 
Heidegger stems from his tendency towards logical positivism and his refusal to 
acknowledge the idea of a phenomenological phenomenon as including that which is 
hidden (Hallman 1985, 301) Hallman points out that while Heidegger uses 
phenomenology as the appropriate method for his task of fundamental ontology, 
Edwards is using conceptual analysis in an attempt to clarify Heidegger’s thought, 
and rejects his phenomenology. I believe that many of Edwards’ claims are mainly 
the result of misinterpretation and a failure to address the proper place of death 
within the context of Heidegger’s broader ontological project. Edwards takes
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Heidergger’s definition of death as the “ownmost nonrelational, certain, and as such, 
indefinite and not to be bypassed possibility o f  Dasein. As the end of Dasein, death 
is the being of this being-foward-its-end,” (SZ 258-259) and breaks it down into 
parts, offering criticisms of each specific concept.
The first aspect of death Edwards addresses is death as nonrelational 
possibility, which Edwards interprets wrongly as meaning ‘all humans die alone.’ He 
himself acknowledges that Heidegger never uses the world ‘alone’ (allein, in 
German) but says “he uses various expressions which come to the same thing. He 
constantly speaks of death as a ‘non-relational possibility.’” (Edwards 1979, 6) 
Furthermore, when Heidegger speaks of death as wrenching one away from the They, 
Edwards translates this as meaning ‘from other people,’ (Edwards 1979, 6) thus 
implying that death tears Dasein away, literally, from others, and is a mistranslation 
of das Man. He argue that it is false to claim that all humans die alone, since we can 
point to examples where people die with others; in a train accident with many 
fatalities, for example, Edwards says we cannot claim that these people died alone, 
since there were others present who also died at the same time. Furthermore, if dying 
alone were to be interpreted as a psychological or emotional state of loneliness or 
alienation, it is also not always the case that people die alone. Edwards claims 
“‘dying alone’ has been redefined so as to be logically equivalent to ‘dying,’” 
(Edwards 1979, 9) but this is a patently false claim, and many people have pointed 
out that Heidegger never redefines the term nor even uses the word ‘alone’ in this 
context (Hinman 1978, 205) When Heidegger says that “all relations to other Dasein 
are dissolved in [death],” (SZ 250) he is referring to an ontological characteristic of 
death, that Dasein is concerned only with its own being, and not to the ontic 
aloneness of one’s specific death.
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Next, he looks at death as an unsubstitutable or untransferable possibility. 
For Heidegger, this means death as an individualizing possibility, the one that is most 
mine and the one possibility where no one can substitute for me. Edwards says it is 
possible for someone to die for me and gives the example of a hostage dying in 
another’s place, but Heidegger himself explicitly says that this is not what he means, 
because the person who has had another die for him has not been ultimately 
delivered from death—at some point each person must die their own death, which no 
other individual can ever prevent or take upon himself. (SZ 240) For Edwards, the 
claim that each person must die their own death is a trite grammatical truth, since 
“the statement that I will die.. .includes as part of its content that the death I will die 
is mine.” (Edwards 1979, 13) This may be true, but what Edwards fails to take into 
account is the role this idea has in the context of all one’s possibilities being 
constituted by the They. The mineness of death means it is an individualizing 
possibility, and upon closer examination of Heidegger’s intended context, it becomes 
evident that this is more than a trite expression of a rule of language. As we saw in 
Section 3.2.2, Philipse concurs with Edwards, saying that all matters of the body are 
unsubstitutable in this sense, since no one can eat, breathe or run for me, and 
therefore this is nothing especially individualizing about death.4 (Philipse 1998, 360) 
However, as Hinman points out, things like eating or breathing are not “things which 
necessarily stand on my horizon; they are not for me necessary ‘not yet’s,” (Hinman 
1978, 202) and I believe he is correct—physical processes like eating, although 
unsubstitutable, do not have the same ontological function as death. We must accuse
4 Philipse believes that Heidegger’s failure to account for the role o f the human body “seriously 
distorts his analysis o f everyday life .. .[since] my genetic structure, my bodily constitution, and my 
personal history are determining factors o f equal importance.” (Philipse 360-361) It is worth noting 
that our way o f interpreting these factors is itself determined by the They, and cannot be said to be 
independent o f any social context.
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Heidegger of perhaps omitting to mention the unsubtitutability of bodily functions, 
but must also remember that part of Heidegger’s task is determining the totality of 
Dasein, and eating does not have claim to the same ontological significance as death. 
Finishing a meal does not mark the end of Dasein’s possibilities in the way that death 
does. In terms of unsubstitutability, death, on its own, is not unique. In combination 
with its other characteristics, however, it is a distinctive phenomenon.
Edwards also addresses the concept of being-towards-death. Dying, in the 
existential sense of the term, is being-towards-death. Heidegger makes a distinction 
between death and dying, death being existential concept of the end of Dasein (its 
ownmost, nonrelational, not to be bypassed possibility) and dying, or being-towards- 
death, being the ontological structure of having a relation towards death. Edwards 
claims that Heidegger uses death to mean death in the usual sense as well as concern 
about one’s death, (Edwards 1979, 22) and the fact that Dasein is always being- 
towards-death simply means “first, that human beings die, and second, that unlike 
plants and animals they know and are, fugitively or nonfugitively, concerned about 
their death.” (Edwards 1979, 21-22) To say that we are dying as long as we live, 
therefore, simply means that we are always know we are going to die—Edwards 
claims that Heidegger has redefined ‘dying’ or being-towards-death to mean concern 
about death. As such, Heidegger’s claim that we are always being-towards-death is 
another platitude without much philosophical import. Once again, this is a case of 
Edwards’ failure to understand the ontological significance of Heidegger’s ideas. 
Edwards takes dying to mean the period of time between one’s ‘death-producing 
event’ (the beginning of the thing that is the cause of death, eg. a plane crash or 
cancer) and one’s actual moment of death. (Edwards 1979, 28-29) If this is the case, 
then it is easy to see how Edwards takes issue with Heidegger’s claim that we are
86
always dying. However, Heidegger is using ‘dying’ to describe an existential. 
Being-towards-death is much more than the straight-forward knowledge and concern 
about death; the term is used by Heidegger to refer to an ontological structure of 
Dasein, whereas concern about death is an ontic reaction. Being-towards-death 
means much more than just being concerned with one’s death—it is an existential 
that underlies the being of each Dasein, constantly informing the possibilities it 
chooses.
One of the most controversial issues in Heidegger’s account of death is the 
idea of death as possibility. Indeed, if  this claim is investigated without giving 
proper attention to its context, it can seem utterly confused. As we saw in the 
previous chapter of this dissertation, Heidegger distinguishes between two senses of 
possibility. The ontic sense refers to objects at hand, and involves things that can be 
actualized: “what is not yet real and not always necessary.” (SZ 143) For instance, 
the possibility of my eating a banana is an ontic possibility because it is not 
necessary that I eat it, but it is a real event that can be actualized in the future if  I do 
eventually eat the banana. Possibility as an existential, however, is a way of being 
that belongs to Dasein's being; the possibilities of Dasein are ways of being that it 
can choose. Edwards contends that death is a possibility for Heidegger precisely 
because “death gives Dasein nothing to ‘be actualized’ and nothing which it itself 
could be as something real,” (SZ 262) and this is based on the idea that if  something 
is not actual, it is possible. Edwards calls Heidegger’s use of ‘possibility’ in relation 
to death “fantastically misleading” (Edwards 1979, 33) because he is not using the 
term in its ordinary sense, nor in the sense that he himself has advanced. Heidegger 
defines Dasein’s existential possibility as “ways of taking care of the ‘world’ which 
we characterized, of concern for others and, always already present in all o f this, the
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potentiality of being itself, for its own sake.” (SZ 143) Possibilities are different 
ways of being into which Dasein projects itself, involving how it is concerned with 
the surrounding world, other individuals, and its own being. Edwards, it seems, 
takes death as a possibility in the ontic sense first mentioned, which is why he cannot 
make sense of Heidegger’s claim. He says “the total absence of experiences and 
behavior is most emphatically not what we mean by ‘possibility’ in any of its 
ordinary senses and it is equally not what Heidegger himself meant when he 
introduced the word ‘possibility’ in his special sense to mean the actions or conduct 
or mode of life which a person may choose.” (Edwards 1979, 33) However, 
Edwards is conflating the concept of demise, as the event that signals the end of 
Dasein’s possibilities, with being-towards-death as a way of directing itself towards 
the world. If we understand being-towards-death as Dasein relating itself to the 
world and others in a way that understands death as individuating, nonrelational, 
certain and indefinite, then death is a possibility in the existential sense.
Philipse believes Heidegger’s claim that the anticipation of death allows 
Dasein to understand its being as a totality rests on a confusion about wholeness. 
Philipse distinguishes between two types of wholeness, synchronic and diachronic. 
Diachronic wholeness includes the temporal whole of something from the moment of 
its inception to the moment of its destruction, whereas synchronic wholeness is the 
wholeness of something at one point in time. The example Philipse gives will make 
this clearer; consider the idea of living in one’s house as a whole. If I am living in all 
the rooms of my house, I am living in the house as synchronic whole. If I lived in 
the house from the moment it was built until it was demolished by a wrecking ball, I 
will have lived in the house as a diachronic whole. (Philipse 1998, 369) He believes 
that when Heidegger speaks of the wholeness of Dasein, he is referring to its
diachronic wholeness, and if this is the case, the problem of wholeness is not unique 
to Dasein. Any being that persists in time presents this same problem when 
phenomenogically determining its existence as a whole, because as soon as it ceases 
to exist, it is no longer a phenomenon available for us. This misunderstands the 
problem of understanding the whole of Dasein. We cannot understand our own 
totality because we cease to exist at the moment it is reached, whereas I can study the 
diachronic wholeness of frogs because I do not cease to exist when the frog does.
If the problem of the totality of Dasein is a problem of diachronic wholeness, 
then anticipating the possibilities of Dasein seems to require the physical ability to 
run ahead in time and survey all of one’s future possibilities. Since this is impossible, 
Philipse says, “the sense in which we might grasp our life as a whole by running 
ahead towards death is to imagine how our future life will be,” (Philipse 1998, 370) 
although the information disclosed by this sort of visualization does not provide us 
with phenomenologically valuable information about the nature o f our being. 
However, Heidegger is not speaking of diachronic wholeness when he introduces the 
problem of the totality of Dasein. He is seeking a way to determine the whole of 
Dasein in terms of its ontological structures, by incorporating the ‘not yet’ into the 
structure of care. The anticipation of possibilities is an ontological concept, and to 
think of it terms of the specific possibilities of a particular Dasein is to apply it 
wrongly, at the ontic level.
4.2 Das Man
Another controversial concept in Being and Time is das Man. Many 
commentators disagree over the proper translation of this term, since in English there 
is no exactly equivalent phrase; throughout this dissertation I have referred to it as
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‘the They,’ in accordance with the idea o f das Man as an indistinct group and its way 
of being, as expressed in the such phrases as ‘They say we ought to do such-and- 
such.’ This English colloquialism is similar to the French usage of on in such 
contexts, or indeed to the German that Heidegger uses. Dreyfus prefers to translate it 
as ‘the One,’ in the sense of ‘One does such-and-such.’ This translation, however, 
brings to mind a distinct, possibly divine, entity, and does not solve the problem of 
ensuring that each Dasein is identified with the They. In keeping with Stambaugh 
and others I believe that the They is an adequate translation, but it is absolutely 
crucial when using this term, however, to remember that the They is not a distinct 
group, since each individual Dasein also belongs to the group. Other possibilities 
include ‘Anyone’ and ‘Everyman,’ although I believe these are less suitable, since 
they seem to carry with them the connotation of one average individual against 
which all others are measured. Although averageness is part of the das Man, this 
translation suggests that there is a particular paradigm o f Dasein that displays the 
characteristics of the They.
The problem with the They is the perceived conflict between its positive and 
negative aspects, which Dreyfus refers to as the difference between conformity and 
conformism. (Dreyfus 1991, 154) For Dreyfus, conformity, the ‘positive’ aspect of 
the They, is the source of all intelligibility in the world because we exist with-others: 
“for both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, then, the source of the intelligibility of the 
world is the average public practices through which alone there can be any 
understanding at all.” (Dreyfus 1991, 155) Dreyfus’ Wittgensteinian interpretation 
of Heidegger means that “das Man denotes the shared norms that determine both 
equipmental use and the point of such use which Heidegger calls significance.” 
(Dreyfus 1995, 424-425) The They embodies a set of public rules that govern how
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we use things and interact with others. On the other hand, the negative levelling 
aspect of the They’s conformism means that it fosters “generality and banality.” 
(Dreyfus 1991, 328) Conformism indicates Dasein’s readiness to accept the They’s 
decision about ‘how things ought to be’ rather than thinking it out for itself and 
taking responsibility for its decisions.
Olafson disagrees with Dreyfus’ Wittgensteinian interpretation o f das Man, 
saying “Heidegger does not cite any real context of shared work or social co­
operation.” (Olafson 1994a, 57) The Wittgensteinian interpretation means Dreyfus 
defines the They as the normal user of equipment, (Dreyfus, 141) but his references 
to cultural norms seems inappropriate. A cultural norm is a standard or typical value 
upheld by a society, and Heidegger never makes any reference to norms or culture in 
Being and Time. Dreyfus gives the example that ‘one pays one’s taxes’ as a cultural 
norm—this is the normal thing to do in our society. Yet this seems to imply that not 
paying one’s taxes means one has broken free from the They. However, the 
individual who refuses to pay his taxes in everyday life is still inauthentic. Defining 
the They as he does disregards the point that everything we do in our everydayness, 
whether or not it is what people generally do in a certain situation, still involve 
absorption in the They.
Olafson emphasizes the importance of negative aspect of the They for 
Heidegger’s project, and his portrayal of it as “an active force making for 
conformism and discouraging anything that departed from the norms of a thoroughly 
anonymous social life.’ (Olafson 1994a, 58) Dreyfus’contention that the They 
involves rules for the use of equipment is at odds with Olafson’s claim that “das Man 
is at bottom a deformation of Mitsein.” (Olafson 1994, 59) Characterizing the They 
as simply shared rules “assimilate[s] other Daseins to the ontological status o f the
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ready-to-hand (zuhanden) which is appropriate to the non -Dasein entities that we 
make use of, but not to a Mitdasein.” (Olafson 1994b, 336) The rules that govern the 
use of equipment differ greatly from the ways we interact with other Daseins. 
Furthermore, if  Dreyfus’ account of the They is correct, authenticity, as detaching 
one’s self form the They, would seem to result in a loss of intelligibility and the 
inability to interact with the world. (Olafson 1994b, 336) We might respond to 
Olafson’s claim by pointing out that this would be correct if  authenticity involved a 
complete detachment from the They, but Dreyfus points out that this is not what 
Heidegger intends to say. (Dreyfus 1995, 426) Authentic existence cannot be 
detachment from the world because resoluteness discloses that Dasein’s real being is 
in-the-world: “resoluteness brings the self right into its being together with things at 
hand, actually taking care of them, and pushes it toward concerned being-with with 
the others,” (SZ 298) but it does it in such a way that is directed towards its true 
potentiality-for-being.
It seems as if Heidegger is straddling both sides of the issue, and textual 
evidence can be found to support both Olafson and Dreyfus. (Carman 1994, 213) 
Looking at Being and Time, we can see that Heidegger seems to vacillate between 
the idea of the They as a source of shared intelligibility and the They as a levelling 
public force that removes our self. Many of Heidegger’s views in Section 27, where 
he discusses everydayness and the They, support the claim of conformism: “We 
enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and 
judge literature and art the way they see and judge.” (SZ 126-127) However, this is 
an ontic characteristic, and takes account of the They solely in existentiell terms. 
Ontologically, the They levels down and makes everything average. Its tendencies 
are not confined to the decisions we make in everyday life, but as “an
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existential...[and] primordial phenomenon” o f Dasein, it obscures the being of 
Dasein. A description of the They as encompassing the anonymity and herd 
mentality of mass culture is an ontic explanation. It does not take into account the 
They as an existential of Dasein that obscures Dasein’s being as such. If we 
understand the They at an ontological level as that which obscures Dasein’s being, 
and at an ontic level as dictating Dasein’s behaviour and thought in a certain way, the 
ambiguities can be resolved.
4.3 Authenticity
The confusion over the true nature of the They leads to conflicting accounts 
of authenticity, since authenticity is ostensibly the state wherein Dasein has 
wrenched itself free from its absorption in the They. There is a great deal of 
discussion about authenticity in the secondary literature, and I shall address some of 
the main points. The most important issue facing authenticity concerns the 
contradiction in Being and Time over the priority of authenticity. This is also related 
to the idea of the coherency of authenticity resulting in the incoherency of 
inauthenticity, as Dreyfus and Philipse maintain.
4.3.1 The Priority of Authenticity
Let us first look at the question of whether authenticity or inauthenticity is 
more basic. Heidegger makes two conflicting sets of claims. First, he seems to say 
that authenticity is an existentiell modification of the fundamental inauthenticity of 
everydayness: '‘''Authentic being one’s se lf is not based on an exceptional state of the 
subject, a state detached from the they, but is an existentiell modification o f  the they 
as an essential existential,” (SZ 130) “Authentic existence is nothing which hovers
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over entangled everydayness, but is existentially only a modified grasp of 
everydayness,” (SZ 179) and “Authentic being-a-self shows itself to be an 
existentiell modification of the they which is to be defined existentially.” (SZ 267) 
However, he also makes claims that imply that authenticity is more fundamental than 
inauthenticity: “The they-selfis an existentiell modification of the authentic self,” 
(SZ 317) and “Inauthenticity has possible authenticity as its basis.” (SZ 259) 
Elsewhere, Heidegger has a tendency to use language that suggests authenticity is 
more prior, when he speaks of Dasein ‘fleeing’ or ‘falling prey,’ as if  inauthenticity 
is a state into which Dasein falls or to which it flees from its authentic being.
It is obvious here that one’s conception o f the They will have an impact on 
which is more basic. Dreyfus, for instance, offers an account of das Man that makes 
inauthenticity more prior; because the They consists o f shared public practices that 
give intelligibility, inauthenticity must be more basic. As he says, “Even authentic 
Dasein must in some sense do what one does. Perhaps, when Dasein experiences 
anxiety, it finds itself and others unintelligible. But as soon as it resolutely acts on 
the basis of this anxiety it must do so in conformity with public norms of 
intelligibility.” (Dreyfus 1995, 426) If the world is to be intelligible to authentic 
Dasein, it must still conform to the They in some sense. If this is true, inauthenticity 
must be a more basic state, with authenticity as a modification.
Olafson addresses the problem of the priority of authenticity as a conflict 
between das Man and the ‘I.’ However, his claim that the They is a deformed 
Mitsein means the question at hand is really whether being-with-others is more basic 
than authenticity. In saying that the authentic self is more prior to the They, or that 
the ‘I’ is more prior to the They, he claims that this ‘I’ is simply the “ ‘formally 
distinct’ or individuated character of a single Dasein,” (Olafson 1994a, 58) and in
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this case, it makes sense to say that Dasein is prior, because there must be a Dasein in 
the first place, that can be with-others. Heidegger’s claim that the authentic self is an 
existentiell modification of the They simply states, for Olafson, that “we most 
certainly do not start out in life by standing-on-our-own [being authentic] (and 
sometimes do not ever really reach that point) even though we are, in the other sense, 
distinct individuals.”” (Olafson 1994, 58) The They is therefore prior to the 
authentic self because we always exist with others that influence us and upon whom 
we are dependent. I believe that Olafson’s version o f the They as a form o f Mitdasin 
is not at all what is intended by Heidegger; he reduces inauthenticity to a type of 
being-with-others in which one acts according to cultural norms and proprieties. To 
do this is to deny the ontological function o f the They in Dasein’s being.
Guignon offers a solution to the problem o f priority. He claims that 
Heidegger’s two claims are not necessarily contradictory. If one examines 
Heidegger’s words carefully, it becomes evident that he says authentic being-a-self is 
an existentiell modification of the They, and that the They-self is an existentiell 
modification of the authentic self. Guignon claims that Heidegger differentiates 
between the authentic self and the They as existentials, and authentic being-a-self (or 
authentic existence) and the They-self as existentiell modifications o f these 
existential structures. (Guignon 1984, 329-330) The authentic self, as an existential, 
is “the ‘formal’ structure of Dasein’s existence as a temporal ‘happening.’” (Guignon 
1984, 332) He means that Dasein’s existence is always being-towards-death, and 
this “temporal structure of thrown goal-directedness” (Guignon 1984, 332) applies to 
every Dasein, whether or not they are take it up authentically. The They is also an 
existential, because Dasein is always thrown into the world and must appropriate its 
possibilities from within this world, but because the They is always a defining
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feature of Dasein’s being, authenticity (in contrast to the authentic self) can only be 
“an ‘existentiell modification’ of our essential being as both the Anyone and an 
Authentic self,” (Guignon 1984, 333) in which Dasein directs itself authentically 
towards the possibilities it is thrown into. The They-self is an existentiell 
modification of the authentic self in which being-towards-death is taken up 
inauthentically. This is an interesting interpretation, and would certainly help to 
resolve Heidegger’s contradictory claims, but in Section 27 Heidegger distinguishes 
between the They-self and “the authentic self, the self which has explicitly grasped 
itself.” (SZ 129) This is clearly at odds with Guignon’s claim that the authentic self 
is the structure of Dasein’s thrown projection, regardless of its authentic or 
inauthentic status. I believe that Heidegger meant that authenticity is the 
existentially prior state, but because it cannot offer a new set o f possibilities for 
Dasein, existentielly it must modify the possibilities it takes up from the They. We 
can still make sense of the They-self as an existentiell modification o f the authentic 
self, as a way of being that directs its possibilities towards the They, rather than 
towards its own authentic potentiality-for-being.
4.3.2 Is Inauthenticity Incoherent?
The relation between authenticity and inauthenticity raises the problem of 
how authenticity is even possible. If inauthenticity is a necessary existential of 
Dasein’s being, how can this ever be overcome? Dreyfus says this is a result of 
Heidegger’s two versions of falling, the structural account and the 
psychological/motivational account. The structural account involves entanglement in 
the They; in everyday life, we fall prey to the They and absorb ourselves in the world 
in terms of it: “Falling prey to the ‘world’ means being absorbed in being-with-one-
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another as it is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity,” (SZ 175) and “in 
falling prey, Dasein turns away from itself.” (SZ 185) This is “a structural necessity 
since Dasein has to take a stand on itself by taking up the for-the-sake-of-whichs 
provided by the one.” (Dreyfus 1991, 227) By the structural account, falling prey is 
an existential necessity that cannot be escaped. Dreyfus believes that Heidegger also 
offers a psychological account of falling as fleeing, and that this is fundamentally 
flawed. In this story, Dasein flees from itself into the They to avoid the knowledge 
of itself as being-in-the-world: “the absorption of Dasein in the they and in the 
‘world’ taken care of reveals something like a flight o f Dasein from itself as an 
authentic potentiality for being itself.” (SZ 184) Dreyfus says that “Heidegger thus 
collapses the distinction between falling and fleeing. Indeed, he conflates the 
structural and the psychological.” (Dreyfus 1991, 228) It is inaccurate to think of 
‘fleeing’ as a psychological account, since this would be an ontic rather than an 
ontological account, and Heidegger himself says that “our inquiry must guard against 
conflating ontic-existentiell characteristics with ontological-existential 
interpretation.” (SZ 184) Dreyfus goes on to say that “Heidegger wants to derive 
falling-away from motivated flight. That is, he wants to explain the essential 
ontological structure of falling-away as a consequence o f Dasein’s need to deny its 
unsettled way of being,” (Dreyfus 1991, 229) but the references he gives from Being 
and Time do not, I think, show this to be the case.
Dreyfus claims that the motivated account of fleeing that Heidegger gives in 
Division II, in conjunction with his discussion on Angst, is a secularized version of 
Kierkegaard. Fleeing is a parallel to Kierkegaardian sinning, in which Dasein 
chooses inauthenticity: “In choosing inauthenticity, Dasein actively takes over the 
public practices of flight for-the-sake-of covering up its nullity.” (Dreyfus 1991, 315)
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Dreyfus repeatedly refers to Dasein as choosing inauthenticity, when Heidegger 
intends it to be a way o f being that Dasein is always already in. We are always 
already thrown into the They, and authenticity is the mode of being that characterizes \
our everyday being, unless we hear the call o f conscience and make an effort to 
become authentic. There is no process of choice in becoming inauthentic, and 
Dreyfus implies that each Dasein goes through Angst and from this viewpoint 
chooses whether to be authentic or inauthentic: “The alternative to fleeing anxiety is 
to hold onto it.” (Dreyfus 1991, 315) But Heidegger points out that Angst is not 
something that happens to each Dasein. I think that Dreyfus is describing the idea of 
fleeing from Angst as a psychological structure o f falling, when in fact it is perhaps a 
more primordial account of fleeing than the one offered as absorption in the They. 
Dreyfus goes wrong by attributing a voluntary aspect to inauthenticity.
Dreyfus believes that Heidegger’s attempt to secularize Kierkegaard’s 
Christian interpretation of falling as sinfulness results in a contradiction: 
“inauthenticity becomes both inevitable and incomprehensible.” (Dreyfus 1991, 334)
If absorption in the world is a necessary existential of Dasein, then Dasein is 
essentially inauthentic; but if  authenticity leads to “equanimity, appropriate action, 
and unshakable joy” (Dreyfus 1991, 334) it is difficult to see why Dasein would fall 
back into inauthenticity. Dreyfus attributes the problem to Heidegger’s failure to 
completely secularize Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety. Kierkegaard has “a 
Christian conception of the self as needing a meaningful world of its own and 
commitment as providing it,” (Dreyfus 1991, 335) where the anxious individual is 
reluctant to accept this absolute commitment because of the attendant risks of loss 
and grief. In the motivation account, however, Heidegger, has dropped this Christian 
idea of “total commitment and the consequent risk of grief’ (Dreyfus 1991, 335) so
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his account cannot explain why Dasein tends to flee Angst. Philipse believes that the 
contradiction arises not because Heidegger secularized Kierkegaard but because he 
only pretended to, as part of his Pascalian strategy. This strategy that Philipse 
attributes to Heidegger describes an attempt to lead non-believers to Christianity by 
providing an account solely in secular terms, with a conclusion that is so compelling 
that it leads them to Christianity. When Heidegger says that we are not our ‘real’ 
selves in everyday life he implies that “if  we face up to dread, we realize that our 
worldly life is not our true life, and we will venture the leap to an absolute religious 
commitment.” (Philipse 1998, 372) Attributing the Pascalian strategy to Heidegger, 
however, seems like a highly dubious approach, given the lack of any textual 
evidence to support this claim.
4.3.3 Other Assorted Problems with Authenticity
How are we to understand Heidegger’s vacillation over whether there are two 
or three modes of being? We know that there are unquestionably two modes, 
authentic and inauthentic, but he occasionally claims there is a third mode called 
indifference or undifferentiation. Part of the problem lies in the fact that Heidegger 
uses two different terms that mean indifference: Indifferenz and Gleichgiiltigkeit. 
The latter is used in “a merely descriptive and ordinary way, without important 
consequence either with respect to method or content.” (Dostal, 44) Indifferenz, 
however, is the term Heidegger uses when he refers to this vague third mode of being. 
In Section 12, he says “Dasein exists always in one of these modes, or else in the 
modal indifference to them,” (SZ 53) and in Section 45, “this potentiality-of-being 
that is always mine is free for authenticity or inauthenticity, or for a mode in which 
of these has been differentiated.” (SZ 232) Zimmerman contends that this means
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everydayness is an undifferentiated type of existence that can be altered into either 
authentic or inauthentic being. (Zimmerman 1981, 45) In Section 9, Heidegger says 
“at the beginning of the analysis, Dasein is precisely not to be interpreted in the 
differentiation of a particular existence; rather, it is to be uncovered in the indifferent 
way in which it is initially and for the most part. This indifference of the 
everydayness of Dasein is not nothing; but rather, a positive phenomenal 
characteristic.” (SZ 43) This seems to accord with Zimmerman’s contention that 
everydayness is undifferentiated, yet there are numerous examples in Being and Time 
where Heidegger says that everydayness is inauthentic. I venture to put forth the 
possibility that indifference or undifferentiation is the way of being Dasein located 
between inauthenticity and inauthenticity. With Angst and the call of conscience, 
Dasein is pulled from the They into a way o f being where it is no longer concerned 
with beings in the world. In this mode, it is pulled away from absorption in the They, 
but has not yet reached the authenticity that comes with being-in-the-world in 
anticipatory resoluteness. We might think of this undifferentiated mode as a neutral 
position of choice from which Dasein can choose to heed the call o f conscience and 
become authentic, or to ignore it and return to absorption in the They.
Another issue we might address is Heidegger’s problematic claim that 
inauthenticity is not a lower form of being: “the inauthenticity of Dasein does not 
signify a ‘lesser’ being or a ‘lower’ degree of being,” (SZ 43) “neither must the 
entanglement of Dasein be interpreted as a ‘fall’ from a purer and higher ‘primordial 
condition,”’ (SZ 176) and “the ontological-existential structure of falling-prey would 
also be misunderstood if we wanted to attribute to it the meaning of a bad and 
deplorable ontic quality.” (SZ 176) One possible reason that Heidegger makes these 
statements is that normative or valuative claims are ontic concepts. (Llewelyn 1983,
100
131) To say that authenticity is ‘better’ than inauthenticity disregards the ontological 
nature of these modes of being, since valuation is an ontic way o f being that does not 
apply to fundamental ontological structures. But if  this is the case, what can the 
motivation be for choosing to become authentic rather than remaining absorbed in 
the They? Although Heidegger discusses how we can become authentic, he never 
really addresses the question of why we would want to become authentic at all. 
Perhaps the “unshakable joy” that resoluteness gives the authentic individual is 
reason enough.
Many of the criticisms directed at Heidegger’s account of authenticity, death 
and the They stem from a confusion between ontic and ontological structures. 
Generally, these criticisms can be fended off by pointing out the difference between 
the two. For instance, Edwards’ misguided critique is a result of attributing ontic 
characteristics to the ontological features of death, as well as a failure to understand 
these concepts in terms of fundamental ontology. However, some o f the confusion 
and controversy that arises over authenticity and the They comes down to 
Heidegger’s terminology and his attribution of unusual and distinct meanings to 
common words. There are internal contradictions and problems within the project, 
especially in terms of the positive and negative functions of the They, the priority of 
authenticity, and Dasein as the caller of conscience. The huge amount o f secondary 
literature published on these themes attests to this, and yet no definitive answers have 
been given. I believe part of the problem in sorting this out has to do with the fact 
that Heidegger never managed to write the rest of the work. The part of Being and 
Time we do have is merely a preparatory analysis. Several scholars have pointed out 
that Heidegger discards various concepts later in his career. Indeed, in the present
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form, the concept of the They is unclear and must be worked out. Furthermore, the 
account of conscience seems untenable unless Heidegger can explain from whom the 
call comes. Generally, however, the accounts o f being-in-the-world and Angst are 
insightful and have provided a new and helpful way o f thinking of our selves and the 
world.
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5. Conclusion
Heidegger never completed Being and Time. The published work was meant 
to be merely the first half of a complete and systematic phenomenological account of 
fundamental ontology. The first half was described by Heidegger as “the 
interpretation of Dasein on the basis of temporality and the explication o f time as the 
transcendental horizon of the question of being,” (SZ 39) with the unwritten second 
half to use the findings o f the previous section as a guideline for a 
“phenomenological destructuring of the history o f ontology.” (SZ 39) As such, the 
philosopher must keep in mind that the text of Being and Time is incomplete, and 
remember that the work Heidegger provides was not meant to be the entire picture.
It is important to keep this in mind when one looks at the existential analysis 
of Dasein. Being and Time is not solely a work o f the ontology of human being, but 
a first stage in answering the question of the meaning o f being. The existential 
structures of Dasein that Heidegger has set out must be thought of as relating back to 
this project; he did not set out to analyze Dasein for the sake o f understanding human 
being, but in order to understand being in general. Dasein is the necessary first step 
in understanding being because it is the only thing that can understand being. 
Heidegger took the unprecedented philosophical step of understanding Dasein as it is 
in its everyday existence. As human beings, we always exist in the world; while 
other philosophers thought it was possible to detach one’s self from the world as a 
pure ‘I,’ Heidegger realized that we are always concerned with the world, and the 
objects and individuals within it, and oriented his phenomenological investigation 
towards this realization. From the existentiell structures that make up Dasein’s 
everyday existence, Heidegger sought to determine the underlying existential
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structures that make it possible for us to interact with objects and other individuals, 
and to be individuals that always have possibilities. The essential nature of Dasein as 
understanding being means that it can always be in a different way than it is, unlike 
rocks or cats. Part of our understanding o f being means that we have knowledge of 
our finitude, and death is an ever-present concept in our lives. But because Dasein is 
a social animal, concerned with others, it is absorbed in the public world and adopts 
the tendency of the public world to cover over being. Dasein is inauthentic in 
everyday life, but is capable of breaking out of the absorption and concealment of the 
They, in order to reach authenticity. Angst discloses to Dasein that it is being-in-the- 
world, and that as a result, it is always thrown into a situation not of its choosing, but 
from which it must project its possibilities and become itself. The possibilities of 
inauthentic Dasein are determined by the They, but without the realization o f Dasein 
that this is the case. The only possibility that is properly Dasein’s own is death, and 
authenticity thus requires a specific attitude towards death. The call o f conscience 
discloses to Dasein that its being is care, namely that it is concerned with the world, 
and thrown into the world, and has possibilities only within the world. Yet the basis 
of care is a nothingness, as death too is ultimately a nothingness, and authentic 
Dasein takes up this disclosure and directs itself onto its possibilities in the 
knowledge that it is possible to be one’s real self even in the midst o f the 
concealment and absorption of the everyday world. Authenticity is ultimately the 
understanding that we are finite beings, with contingent possibilities, and neither our 
own being or what we do is necessary; rather than turning away from this seemingly 
disheartening disclosure, authentic Dasein takes it up joyfully and lives a life free 
from concealment and the dominance of others.
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